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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
P2PSIP is regarded as a promising solution for future 
communication systems. In this chapter, we introduce the 
background of research topic, the research area and target, the 
motivation, and the thesis overview.   
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing has attracted great attention in both academia and 
industry. Comparing with traditional server-based system architecture in which most 
of functionality is executed on server side, P2P-based computing allocates computing 
task to all participating peers. This might eliminate/reduce functionality of server and 
therefore provides better robustness on system level. Today, P2P computing has been 
widely implemented in many kinds of networking systems and applications.  
In communication field, one of the most well-known P2P applications is Skype [22], 
which offers free Voice-over-IP (VoIP) and Instant Messaging (IM) services for 
computer-to-computer and charged services for computer-to-PSTN. Additionally, 
Skype service has been extended to mobile world. Many mobile platforms today (e.g. 
Symbian S60 [15], iPhone OS [3], Android [1], Windows Mobile [13], etc), have Wi-
Fi/3G connection based Skype application. According to eBay statistics [9], the 
number of Skype users has reached 521 million before Q3, 2009, and it is still growing 
fast.  
However, Skype protocol has been monopolized and is not publicly available. 
Although part of its functionality (e.g. login, NAT traversal, media transfer, codec, etc) 
has been understood via analyzing Skype network traffic [33, 43, 51], researchers 
(outside Skype project) are still uncertain about its core technical specification, 
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disadvantages, and required improvement. Besides, Skype does not provide 
interoperability with other open applications, such as SIP based WLM (Windows Live 
Messenger) [28] , Yahoo IM [31], etc. This is partly because of technical difficulty in 
seamless interconnecting among different protocols, and partly because of 
unwillingness of cooperation with its competitors.  
The success of Skype greatly inspired the research on peer-to-peer based 
communication systems. Researchers were trying to find an alternative solution where 
on one hand, decentralized nodes are capable to auto-configure themselves in IP-based 
Ad-Hoc style; and on the other hand, the designed protocol supports fast location of 
nodes, optimized route selection, secure and reliable service delivery. Let us take a 
look at Figure 1-1, which illustrates an example of P2P based communication 
paradigm. Each node in the system has a few connections with its neighbours, and 
these neighbours act as intermediate nodes to deliver requests and responses. A few 
routing mechanisms, negotiation protocols are supposed to be implemented so that 
session between source peer (for instance, A in the figure) and destination peer (B) can 
be established in optimized way. The designed protocol is assumed to be an open 
standard so that everyone could develop applications on it.   
 
Figure  1-1: P2P based Communication 
However, reality is different. After a few studies, researchers began to recognize that it 
was not trivial to realize this type communication paradigm. P2P protocol lacks of 
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session level description and negotiation mechanisms, which make some 
functionalities (such as optimized route selection, media codec negotiation, etc) 
difficult to achieve. At this moment, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) comes into the 
sight.  
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a transaction-oriented, text-based protocol that 
inherits the simplicity from Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [108]. It is designed to create, modify, and terminate 
sessions with one or more participants. Because of its characteristics (e.g. simplicity, 
extensibility, flexibility, etc), SIP is chosen by 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) as the main protocol for the IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS)-based future 
All-IP network [21]. SIP to telecommunication systems is regarded as important as 
HTTP to Internet.  
Therefore, researchers began to study approaches that combine decentralization nature 
of P2P with efficiency of SIP protocol. In 2003, the SIPpeer project at University of 
Columbia [101, 102] and the SOSIMPLE project at William & Mary College [36] 
were the first attempts of study of P2PSIP communication systems. In the following 
years, the P2PSIP research has attracted great attention both from academia and 
industry (e.g. Cisco, Nokia, Ericsson, HuaWei, etc). IETF P2PSIP Working Group 
defines the motivation of P2PSIP [18] as following: “The concept behind P2PSIP is to 
leverage the distributed nature of P2P to allow for distributed resource discovery in a 
SIP network, eliminating (at least reducing) the need for centralized servers”.  
A lot of possible solutions have been proposed in recent publications [37, 41, 48, 75] 
and Internet-drafts [38, 59, 73, 104] . However, P2PSIP is still far from mature. Many 
technical issues are waiting for solutions. Two of the most critical issues are efficiency 
and security.  
As originally designed for file sharing, P2P protocol does not focus much on system 
efficiency. For instance, the delay in P2P applications (e.g. BitComet [4], BitTorrent 
[5], etc) can be from a few seconds to even minutes. This is unacceptable in real-time 
multimedia services. Therefore, conventional peer/resource lookup algorithm is 
required to be improved or replaced.  
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Besides, the decentralized nature of P2P comes to the cost of less or decentralized 
management, which might also create security problems. In such scenario all 
participating nodes may distrust each other due to lack of centralized credential 
mechanism. It is possible that some malicious nodes create negative experience to the 
other nodes (for example, modify the received message and forward it out) or the 
overlay. Therefore, data transactions from beginning to end are regarded as not trusted. 
1.2 RESEARCH AREA AND SUBJECT DEFINITION 
As argued in the previous section, P2PSIP is a new future trend  [52, 115, 123]. The 
research area of this work is a P2PSIP based communication paradigm. The related 
technical issues include: P2P, SIP, P2PSIP, client, system efficiency, security, and 
interworking. 
There are three main entities in P2PSIP systems: peer, client, and resource. Peer is a 
node that participates in overlay and is responsible for distributed storage and 
cooperative transport services. Client is a special entity, which participates in overlay; 
however, does not make contribution to other nodes due to node’s unwillingness or 
limitation of system capabilities (e.g. low CPU power, bandwidth, storage, etc). 
Resource is data that is distributed and stored among participating peers.  
Our work focuses on P2PSIP session initiation process, especially on how to improve 
system efficiency and enhance security. Besides, we also consider inter-working issues. 
We do not consider much about advanced services, such as Voice-over-IP, group 
chatting, off-line messages, etc. We believe that these use scenarios are supported as 
soon as protocol is standardized. In addition, the thesis does not consider much about 
how overlay activities, such as Churn (peer join/leave frequently) and their impact on 
the P2P network. 
1.3 MOTIVATION 
The goal of this work is to investigate P2PSIP based paradigm in communication 
systems and study possible solutions that are capable to solve critical issues in P2PSIP 
systems mentioned in the previous sections.  
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Since P2PSIP systems are not efficient, our first attempt is to use (adapt) a few 
conventional and novel approaches to reduce delays during session establishment 
phase. The proposed mechanisms should act as the extended functionality that enriches 
the current approaches. 
Since P2PSIP system is not secure [58, 96] and quite few researchers are focused on 
this issue. Our aim is to investigate security challenges and propose feasible security 
enhancement mechanisms. For instance, it is necessary to study both central based 
security and distributed based security approaches. Besides, appropriate combination 
of these two security solutions in one system might provide the optimized result.  
Moreover, a P2PSIP client, as a ”weak link” of a P2PSIP system that might not have 
enough capabilities (e.g. high CPU power, bandwidth, storage, etc) to access/protect 
services, needs special concern. Although there are already published proposals, they 
still contain many issues that need to be solved (insecure, immature, difficult to 
implement, etc., as discussed in Chapter 7). Our goal is to propose a feasible, reliable, 
and secure alternative solutions that are capable to be implemented by most of portable 
and fixed devices currently existing. 
Last but not the least, the future goes for All-IP IMS based network. Therefore, 
P2PSIP needs efficient and secure inter-working solutions interconnecting with IMS. 
Our intention is to integrate concept of security mechanisms with usage of 
interworking gateway and propose appropriate interconnecting system architecture.  
1.4 THESIS OVERVIEW 
The following Chapter 2 introduces state of the art of this thesis’ research area. It 
contains description of P2P computing, SIP and SDP protocol, and survey of P2PSIP 
approaches. In the survey, we introduce P2PSIP requirement, current proposals, and 
existing challenges.  
Chapter 3 studies a few approaches that can be implemented to improve P2PSIP 
system efficiency via reducing delay during session establishment. After that, some of 
mechanisms are implemented and experimentally evaluated. 
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Chapter 4 makes a survey on P2PSIP security. It starts with introduction of security 
challenges including general security problems and P2P specific problems, followed 
by possible solution proposed.  
To solve security problem, Chapter 5 introduces two solutions: central based security 
and distributed trust security, both of which have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. After that, we study possible combination of these two approaches to 
get optimized protection. 
Chapter 6 introduces a possible inter-working model that interconnects P2PSIP with 
future All-IP based IMS network. The security approaches introduced in Chapter 5 can 
be reused here. 
Chapter 7 discusses a possible system architecture for P2PSIP client to access services. 
The proposed solution, after comparison with early proposed solution (client protocol 
solution), is shown to be better than previous proposal. The security approaches 
described in Chapter 5 can be reused here. 
At last Chapter 8 concludes thesis and suggests future work. 
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Chapter 2. State-of-the Art 
 
This chapter introduces state of the art of P2PSIP. It starts with 
introduction of P2P technology and specification of P2P overlay 
algorithms; followed by description of SIP protocol. After that, we 
make a survey on P2PSIP according to recent proposals. The 
survey includes technical requirements, current proposals, and 
existing challenges.  
 
2.1 PEER-TO-PEER TECHNOLOGY  
Peer-to-Peer system has been utilized for more than 30 years. In 1979, Usenet [25] was 
developed to exchange information among Unix systems, based on Unix-to-Unix-copy 
(UUCP) protocol. In the following years, Usenet grew from the original two sites to 
hundreds of thousands of sites. Generally, Usenet is the grandfather of all P2P 
networks.  
P2P systems get fast development from 1990s, from first generation centralized P2P 
applications (such as Napster [14], SETI@Home [20], etc) in which a centralized 
server is implemented for index services, to the second generation decentralized but 
unstructured P2P such as Gnutella [32] and Freenet [42]. More advanced technology is 
based on structured network, especially Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [43], in which 
overlay algorithms provide auto-configuration and routing optimization.   
In this section, Peer-to-Peer related technologies are described. The comparison 
between P2P model and traditional Client/Server (C/S) based model is presented. After 
that, we specify P2P overlay networks with special focus on DHT overlay suggested 
for P2PSIP communication.  
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2.1.1 Peer-to-Peer vs Client-Server  
Before introducing what is P2P, let us take a look at C/S based system architecture 
presented in Figure 2-1 (a). It is the most popular system approach today. In this 
approach, the most important unit is the server, providing resources such as storage 
and computing capability to clients. A client, who wants to connect to the other clients, 
has to ask a server for establishing such connections. Since the number of servers is 
limited and system capacity is fixed, the increasing number of clients means reduction 
of performance for all users. One of the most famous examples of using C/S 
architecture is Internet infrastructure.  
The peer-to-peer approach is presented in Figure 2-1 (b) [19]. In this approach, all 
participating nodes are equal. Nodes provide resources, which might include storage 
space, bandwidth, and computing power. Nodes cooperate with each other to provide 
storage and transport services. For example, when connection is needed, source node 
sends a request message to a few neighbours, asking: “Do you know the destination 
peer D?”. The neighbours forward the request, step-by-step until the destination peer D 
is reached. The Total capacity of P2P system increases with the arrival of new 
participating nodes. Besides, in some cases this network model is more robust than 
C/S model when facing security breaches such as compromised or faulty nodes.  
  
Figure  2-1: Client-Server model v.s. Peer-to-Peer model 
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2.1.2 P2P Overlay 
One of the best definitions of overlay network is given in [113]: “An overlay network 
is virtual network of nodes and logical links that is built on top of an existing network 
with the purpose to implement a network service that is not available in the existing 
network.” 
Structured overlay, especially DHT (Distributed Hash Table) technologies, has been 
suggested for P2PSIP communications. According to this technology, each peer 
maintains the state of a few neighbours. Peers in the overlay cooperate with each other 
to complete the lookup tasks (e.g. find a peer, resource, etc). In the following section, 
we specify three types of overlay algorithms and give comparison and evaluation of 
typical DHT overlay technologies. 
Chord   
In Chord [109] overlay, peers and resources construct a ring with the space size of 
[0, 12 −m ], as shown in Figure 2-2 (a) where m is equal 5. In the ring, peer and 
resource are represented by integer Node ID or Resource ID. Each peer stores a certain 
amount of <id, value> pairs, in which id is the peer/resource ID, value is the peer 
address information or the data storage. Peer or resource ID is assigned by consistent 
hashing [66], e.g. based on SHA-1 algorithm, etc. For instance, the peer ID can be 
produced by hashing IP address of particular peer; and resource ID can be generated 
by hashing the data value. The Resource is stored in the first peer, whose ID is bigger 
or equal to Resource ID (see Figure 2-2 (c)). For example, the resources with IDs 14 
and 20 are stored in peer with ID 22.  
Each peer contains a routing table, called Finger table, for storing records containing 
routing information. The Finger table contains records about Nlog  successors of its 
peer where N is the number of peers in the overlay (see Figure 2-2 (b)). Suppose the 
space size of overlay is m2 , for some integer m. Then, according to [109], the ID of the 
i-th successor a peer with ID P  (denoted as Succid(i)) can be found as following:  
)0(2mod)2()( 1 miPiSuccid mi ≤<+= −
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Each peer contacts periodically its successors for updating corresponding Finger table. 
It also contacts its predecessors that are previous peers in the ring. This is useful when 
a peer leaves the ring and asks its predecessors to update their Finger tables.  
Chord routes the message by sending messages to the next successor nearest to the 
destination identifier. Consider an example, where peer 3 is searching peer 28 (Figure 
2-2 (d)). The peer 3 would first check its Finger table; choose a successor (peer 22) 
nearest to the destination, and then send a request to this successor. The peer 22 would 
also check its own finger table and forward the message to its successor (destination 
peer 28). According to the simulation result in paper [109], the average path length of 
Chord is Nlog
2
1
, where N is the number of peers in the overlay. 
Chord also defines the advertisement function supporting joining/leaving procedure 
for peers. The advertisement function would tell corresponding successors and 
predecessors to update their Finger tables. 
 
Figure  2-2: Chord Algorithm 
State-of-the Art   
 11 
Kademlia   
Kademlia (Kad) is another popular DHT solution proposed in 2002 [76]. It shares 
some similarities with Chord. For instance, peer identifiers are produced by consistent 
hashing; each <resource id, value> pair is stored in a node with ID “close” to the 
resource id. One main difference is that Kad network is a binary tree, where peers are 
represented as leaves. Figure 2-3 shows a simplified structure example with 3-bit 
address space. Each peer and object in the Kad network has a 160-bit identifier. To 
construct the routing table, each peer separates this binary tree (without the peer itself) 
into a set of sub-trees. For instance, peer 0011 in the Figure 2-3 splits the binary tree 
into 4 sub-trees. Each peer maintains at least one peer profile (peer ID, IP address, port, 
etc) in each of the sub-trees. Kad uses XOR-based metric for calculating distance. 
Given two identifiers, x and y with peer ID 0011 and 1101, distance ),( yxd between 
two peers is 111011010011 =⊕=⊕ yx  To route the message, source peer first 
analyses the distance to destination peer, and then forwards the messages to the nearest 
peer (with shortest distance to the destination) according to the  routing table. 
Figure 2-4 shows a routing example when peer 0011 wants to contact with peer 11110 
(assume that peer 101 is the only reachable peer in source peer’s routing table). The 
request message might first go to peer 101, and be redirected to peer 1101, peer 1110, 
and finally to the destination peer.  
 
Figure  2-3: Kademlia Tree Structure [76] 
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Figure  2-4: Kademlia Routing [76] 
 
Content Addressable Network (CAN)   
CAN technology [85] shares similarities with Chord and Kad approaches. The biggest 
difference is that CAN uses a logical grid structure based on a virtual d-Cartesian 
Space.  Figure 2-5 shows the simplified two-dimensional structure. Peer and resource 
are mapped into the space of the grid based on their coordinates. Each peer maintains a 
certain space around itself and stores resources within nearby coordinates. For instance, 
peer A is responsible to store data with the coordinate (0.7, 0.25).  As to routing 
mechanism, each node constructs its own space routing table that records information 
about neighbour space (e.g. IP address, port, coordinate, etc). With this information, 
peers are able to forward the messages to a neighbour that is closer to the target. For 
instance, the request from peer H travels through a few neighbors until the destination 
peer J (see Figure 2-6).  
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Figure  2-5: CAN Overlay 
 
Figure  2-6: CAN Routing 
Evaluation of DHT algorithms 
There are other DHT algorithms that are promising for the future P2PSIP 
communication, such as Pastry [93], Tapestry [117], Bamboo [51], etc. These 
algorithms use similar approaches as Chord and Kademlia described above. For 
instance, they also implement SHA-1 hashing function, have the algorithm complexity 
of )(log NO . Table 2-1 from [55] summarizes properties of different DHT algorithms.  
Table  2-1 Overlay Technologies Comparison [55] 
 
 
Chord CAN Pastry Bamboo Tapestry Kademlia 
Lookup 
method 
R, S-R, I R, S-R, I R, S-R, I R, S-R, I R, S-R, I R, 
S-R, I 
Complexity simple simple Quite 
complex 
Quite 
complex 
Quite 
complex 
Simple 
Configuratio A few Many  Some  Some  A small A few 
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n parameters affect  
Bandwidth 
consumption 
Moderate  Moderate High  Moderat
e 
Quite 
high 
Moderate 
 
Peer 
join/departur
e 
Quite 
simple 
Very 
simple 
Complex 
join  
Quite 
simple 
Complex 
join 
Simple  
 
Extendibility Quite 
good 
Rich 
already 
Quite 
good 
Quite 
good 
Quite 
good  
Quite good 
 
2.2. SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a session layer signalling protocol for creating, 
modifying, and terminating sessions with other participants [54]. It inherits the 
simplicity from Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Mail Transfer 
protocol (SMTP). In November 2000, SIP was accepted as a 3GPP signalling protocol 
and the permanent element in future All-IP IMS architecture.  
2.2.1 Protocol Description  
SIP follows traditional Client/Server based model. A SIP network consists a few 
fundamental elements [90]: 
• User Agent (UA). SIP User Agent is the basic element that creates, sends and 
receives SIP messages. It may be either hardware phones from vendors (such as 
Avaya [6], Cisco [7], Nortel [26], etc) or softphones (such as Windows Live 
Messenger [28], X/lite [8], Twinkle [24], etc). UA uses SIP identities (or SIP URI) 
during the communication. One typical example of using SIP URI is 
“sip:alice@altaland.com”, where “Alice” is the user name and “altaland.com” is 
the domain of Alice’s service provider.    
• Registrar. User Agent can not access SIP services before registering to a certain 
SIP network. The Registrar is a server that accepts REGISTER request and place 
UA’s registration information into location database in the domain.  
• Redirect Server. This component redirects the incoming request to another domain 
where destination user agents currently stay. This is useful, for example, when a 
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user is on vocation and wishes the incoming calls to be redirected to his new 
places.   
• Proxy Server. Proxy Server is the central element for relaying SIP traffic among 
different domains.  
Note that the distinction among Registrar, Redirect Server, and Proxy Server is logical. 
Physically, they could be deployed in the same device.  
The basic SIP specification RFC3261 defines some SIP methods which primarily 
handle “call setup” procedures, as shown in Figure 2-8. At the beginning, the user 
Alice sends an INVITE request (F1), which indicates destination SIP address 
“bob@biloxi.com”, to its SIP server. An example is shown below in Figure 2-7 [90]. 
INVITE request can also contain service negotiation parameters (such as supported 
connections type, data rate, codec, etc) for session negotiation (will be specified in 
Section 2.2.2).  
  
 
Figure  2-7: SIP “INVITE” Example  
The atlanta server (see example in Figure 2-8) is responsible to forward the request to 
a corresponding SIP server (for instance, “biloxi”) that is able to reach “Bob” (F2 and 
F4). It also returns a “100 Trying” response, indicating the request is been processed 
successfully (F3 and F5). After that, a “180 Ringing” message is returned (F6-F8), 
representing the ringing of destination client. When “Bob” decides to receive session 
(for example, he picks up the phone), he returns a “200 OK” response to initiator (F9-
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F11). The session can be later established. F13-F14 represents the termination of the 
session.  
 
Figure  2-8: Session Initiation Protocol  
A few SIP Extensions are defined to support typical use scenarios. For example, 
“SUBSCRIBE” and “NOTIFY” are defined in RFC3265 for supporting presence 
service use case [88]; “MESSAGE” is defined in RFC3428 for instant messaging use 
case [91]. 
2.2.2 Session Description Protocol  
Session Description Protocol (SDP), defined in RFC 4566 [53], is an application layer 
protocol intended to describe multimedia sessions. It is used for service negotiation 
during the multimedia session initiation. The negotiation includes media transport 
protocol, media codec, encryption algorithms, etc. The following shows an example of 
SDP sent from Alice to Bob in the end of INVITE message. The first five lines (before 
the “m=” line) contains session-level information. They include the session identifier, 
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IP address, subject, contact info, etc. The following lines illustrate the media-level 
information exchange for transport protocol, opening port number for audio and video:  
v=0 
o=Alice 2790844676 2867892807 IN IP4 192.0.0.1 
s=Let’s talk about swimming techniques 
c=IN IP4 192.0.0.1 
t=0 0 
m=audio 20000 RTP / AVP 0 
a=sendrecv 
m=video 20002 RTP / AVP 31 
a=sendrecv 
 
2.3 PEER-TO-PEER SIP  
P2PSIP aims to combine both the advantages of P2P and SIP protocols in a novel 
communication system. Known research attempts are SIPpeer and SOSIMPLE 
projects, both of which proposed similar solutions [36, 101, 102] where P2PSIP is 
built upon the SIP extension protocol (using SIP protocol for handling everything). 
Although the concept and solutions have been outdated, these two projects led and 
pushed the discussions and development in P2PSIP research.     
From 2005, P2PSIP research attracted much attention both in academia and industry 
(Cisco, Nokia, HuaWei, Ericsson, etc). A few research projects were initiated and 
more and more proposals were discussed in IETF P2PSIP WG (RELOAD [59], P2PP 
[33], dSIP [35, 116], SEP [62], etc.). In this section, we describe the requirement of 
P2PSIP systems; and then discuss technical solutions according to current proposals; 
and finally describe the existing challenges.   
2.3.1 Requirement  
According to recent publications [37, 75, 96], the following requirements are 
fundamental for P2PSIP systems. The requirements are listed in priorities with respect 
to their importance for P2PSIP, where “A” means “already mature in research”; “B” 
means “already have possible solutions, however, needs extra concern”; “C” means 
“critical solutions missing”.   
R1 Availability, Efficiency, and Stability. Priority: B 
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Description: The designed protocol should be able to support a certain typical P2PSIP 
use scenarios. Besides, suggested approaches (such as peer/resource lookup algorithm, 
IP layer transport and routing, etc), should be efficient and fit for user experience. 
Furthermore, the system should provide enough stability, even if the network system is 
under the environment of Churn (peer joins and leaves the overlay frequently).  
 
R2 DHT overlay flexibility. Priority: B 
Description: Currently, Chord is suggested as the mandatory P2PSIP overlay 
algorithm. Considering better scalability and predictability, structured DHT overlay 
should be implemented. The designed peer protocol SHOULD be extensible to 
accommodate differences among overlay technologies (e.g. the existing Pastry, CAN, 
Kademlia, etc), including new algorithms that might appear in the future.  
 
R3 Inter-working. Priority: C 
Description: On one hand, designed protocol SHOULD interwork with traditional 
network (e.g. PSTN/ISDN, etc); on the other hand, it should also provide the interface 
that interconnects with future All-IP based network (e.g. SIP, IMS, etc). 
 
R4 NAT Traversal. Priority: B 
Description: A multitude of users are behind the protection of NAT. Therefore, to 
provide availability and transparency, a few suggested NAT traversal approaches, such 
as STUN/TURN/ICE, SHOULD be integrated into the design of peer protocols. , 
Corresponding solutions should be selected for handling NAT traversal with respect to 
different configurations and environments. Besides, other alternative solutions, such as 
UPnP based NAT traversal, need extra concern and further study.  
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R5 P2PSIP Client. Priority: A 
Description: IETF P2PSIP WG also proposed a new entity of P2PSIP node, called 
“P2PSIP Client”, which are legacy devices that participate in the overlay but are 
excused to make contributions due to lack of the protocol support in DHT algorithm or 
limitation of devices capability (e.g. energy,  CPU processing power, bandwidth, etc). 
In order to access P2PSIP services, these “Client” should affiliate and rely on a normal 
peer for routing and storage. Therefore, it would be necessary to define a separate 
“Client” protocol that associates normal peer and with access services.    
R6 Security requirement. Priority: A 
Description: Security is one of the biggest challenges for peer-to-peer systems, and 
thus for P2PSIP. Security includes transport security, DHT overlay security, Client 
protocol security, and interworking interface security. P2PSIP systems can not work 
well before all these security problems are solved.  
2.3.2 Current Proposals Discussion  
The Internet draft [38] introduces the concept of P2PSIP, as illustrated in Figure 2-9. A 
typical P2PSIP overlay consists of PSTN gateway peers, SIP proxy peers, SIP redirect 
peers, normal peers, and clients. PSTN gateway peers are gateways that interconnect 
with PSTN network, SIP proxy peers and SIP redirect peers are proxies that 
interconnect with SIP network. Note that gateway/proxy peers have basic function of 
normal peer.  
Peers are targeted at end devices/applications that participate in the overlay and offer 
distributed storage and transport services. Note that many peers are under the 
protection of NAT and firewall.  
Clients are special entities that participate in the overlay, however, they do not provide 
any services for other peers. In order to access P2PSIP service, they have to find a 
P2PSIP peer who is willing to help and relay data traffic during connection 
establishment process.  
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Figure  2-9: P2PSIP Overlay 
There are mainly two types of functions in P2PSIP system: maintenance and lookup. 
Maintenance function handles with overlay activities (for example, join/leave the 
overlay, Finger table construction and update, etc). Lookup function sends/forwards 
application messages. Generally, there can be three different approaches to realize 
P2PSIP systems: SIP-based approach that proposes to use SIP messages for both 
maintenance and lookup functions; P2P-based approach which suggests a new P2P 
protocol to realize both functions; and compromised SIP over P2P approach that is the 
appropriate combination of above two solutions.   
SIP based approach 
Typical example of system that realize SIP-based approach is dSIP [35], which 
proposes to use SIP REGISTER request to join, build, and maintain overlay network. 
P2P related information (for example, peer ID) and commands (e.g. join, build, and 
update, etc) can be recorded in SIP extension header. Besides, SDP body is able to 
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carry parameters for session negotiation (e.g. for setting up a media session, ICE 
connections, etc) or function specifications (for instance, using XML file to record 
service profile that is needed in service discovery and announcement).  
This approach sounds feasible because SIP is originally designed as an extendable 
protocol. However, heavy SIP messages and frequent overlay maintenance exchange 
messages might bring overhead problem and add a lot of burden, especially in large 
overlay where thousands of peers generate a huge amount of P2P maintenance 
messages. Therefore, this approach is not scalable.  
P2P based approach   
Typical example of P2P-based approach is SEP [57, 62],which totally abandons the 
usage of SIP. Through defining a separated application layer P2P protocol, SEP 
achieves both maintenance and lookup functionality.  
The design of SEP has a few advantages. Since the designed protocol is specific for 
the applications overlay, it is more flexible and efficient than traditional P2P protocol 
to handle the maintenance activities. For example, SEP defines a prediction 
mechanism, in which upstream peer will be notified if its downstream peer has no 
enough resource to receive request at that time. When receiving notification, upstream 
peer chooses another alternative downstream peer that is in good condition. SEP also 
provides extension interface for service discovery (e.g. some peers in the overlay 
might be able to provide a specific services, such as STUN functions, etc).  
The main problem of SEP may be that it is pure P2P. It involves difficulties to inter-
work with SIP client/application. It looks more like an open “Skype” protocol proposal. 
Another problem is that SEP only supports STUN solution for NAT traversal, which 
might not work in enterprise NAT environment.  
SIP over P2P 
A third approach is the appropriate combination of the two approaches mentioned 
above. The idea is to use a designed P2P protocol to maintain overlay activities, while 
SIP (or SIP related) usage is implemented upon P2P layer. P2P protocol defines 
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overlay network algorithms, TCP and UDP transport protocol, variety of caching, 
striping, congestion control algorithms and error handling [44]. Besides, SIP related 
usage is supposed to handle SIP application functions, such as service description and 
negotiation. This approach is regarded as the most promising option. Typical examples 
are HIP-HOP [58, 68] and RELOAD [59]. 
HIP-HOP achieves message forwarding by using a new Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 
layer [40][79] (shown in Figure 2-10). HIP layer is in the middle of IP and transport 
layers (also called 3.5 layer). It defines a 40 bytes HIP header that mainly includes 
sender’s host identity, receiver’s host identity, and a few control parameters.  HIP-
HOP inherits the concept of ID generation mechanism from HIP protocol, which 
proposes to generate a 128 bits host identity (also peer ID) via consistent hashing (e.g 
SHA-1 algorithm, etc) peer’s public key [39]. After that, the mapping of peer ID and 
SIP URI are distributed and stored in the overlay.  
When a source peer initiates a request (for instance, sending a SIP request), it has to 
ask overlay about the destination peer ID via DHT lookup algorithm. Then, it 
generates HIP message by adding a HIP header in front of IP datagram and sends to a 
downstream peer according to the judgment of the Distributed DB function. The 
intermediate peers, when reading HIP header, can understand how to forward the 
request. Finally, the session between source and destination can be established.   
HIP-HOP proposal makes message forwarding easier via migrating application layer 
message forwarding function (in RELOAD proposal) into lower HIP layer. Besides, 
the use of HIP offers seamless roaming support in the situation that a peer changes IP 
frequently.  
However, one of the biggest problems is in a real implementation. The revision of IP 
stack is not acceptable by most routing solutions currently existing, and this might 
result in message lost because of confusion and misunderstanding (for example, route 
considers received packet as malicious).   
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Figure  2-10: HIP Solution 
Another approach called RELOAD is proposed in [59], with layer architecture 
illustrated in Figure 2-11. P2P layer is defined as an application layer protocol that 
includes four components: 
• Message Transport. This component is responsible for generic key based message 
routing services, according to DHT algorithms.  
• Storage. This is one of the basic functions for storing data in traditional P2P 
overlays.  
• Topology Plugin. Topology Plugin handles flexible overlay algorithms (e.g. Chord 
algorithm in a Chord based overlay) for specific overlay. This part also deals with 
overlay maintenance activities. For example, when peer joins/leaves overlay, 
routing table is required to be reconstructed or deleted.  
• Forwarding and Link Management. This part of the functionality establishes 
connections according to Topology Plugin and Message Transport components. 
Besides, it also handles ICE based NAT traversal solution.    
In RELOAD proposal, each peer is represented by SIP URI and peer ID. SIP URI 
starts with a username (e.g. alice, etc), followed by attached overlay domain name (for 
example, dht.reload.com). Peer ID is a 128 or 160 bits integer randomly generated by 
centralized identity server. After that, the mapping of SIP URI and Peer ID is 
published and stored in the overlay.  
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When a source peer (for instance, alice@uia.no with id 20) wants to call a destination 
peer (for example, bob@uia.no), it has to first apply SHA-1 hash function H on 
bob@uia.no to compute a key H(bob@uia.no). After that, an overlay lookup algorithm 
is executed on H(bob@uia.no) to find ID mapping in the overlay. According to ID 
mapping, source peer is capable to reach destination peer ID (here dest_id) and initiate 
a request (via executing another lookup(dest_id) function by applying lookup 
algorithm to dest_id).  
RELOAD provides feasible solutions for P2PSIP session initiation. However, it also 
has a few disadvantages. Firstly, due to complexity of ID mapping mechanism, source 
peer has to execute two lookup functions before locating destination peer. This may 
cause unacceptable delay. Secondly, RELOAD migrates most of SIP functions (e.g. 
routing, session description and negotiation, etc) to P2P layer. This approach, on one 
hand places burden on protocol design, on the other hand destroys SIP original 
functions. Consider an example of SIP “Via” header, which records profiles (e.g. IP, 
port) of intermediates nodes. In RELOAD solution, this “Via” is set to be empty 
because routing function is taken care by Message Transport component. This might 
cause problem when interconnecting with SIP network because SIP proxy will 
consider received message as malicious.  
 
Figure  2-11: RELOAD Layer Architecture 
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2.3.3 Other Proposals 
At the meantime, there are many other publications focused on P2PSIP, suggesting 
constructive solutions. We briefly review some of them.  
Paper [70] proposes a hierarchical virtualization model, in which a P2PSIP system is 
logically divided into N sublayers according to peer capabilities (e.g. CPU processing 
power, bandwidth, storage, etc). Each peer in thi −  layer of the overlay has one or 
more Son Nodes (SN) acting as contact points in thi −− )1(  layer. According to 
performance analysis, hierarchical division increases overall system capability and is 
capable to reduce delays when setting up connection.  Besides, the system provides a 
“breaching” model to reduce DHT maintenance cost. Each peer has three states: 
active, tired, and asleep. Active is a state when peer is handling application services 
(e.g. sending out SIP messages, call setup, etc); tired state represents a state that 
experiences a long idle interval and becomes tired; asleep follows with tired state 
when peer “sleeps” and temporally leaves the overlay (and therefore does not need 
DHT maintenance).  
There can be different P2PSIP domains that implement different overlay technologies 
(e.g Chord, Kademlia, CAN, etc). Paper [74] considers a system architecture for 
interconnecting among different P2PSIP domains. The idea is that each P2PSIP 
domain selects a super node with extra capability, and these super nodes construct a 
new overlay network. Super node acts as the proxy for each domain when 
interconnecting function is needed. Besides, P2PSIP should also handle the 
interconnection with future All-IP networks (e.g. SIP/IMS-based network, etc). A 
possible system architecture is suggested in [56], in which a Gateway Application 
Server (AS) is proposed as the key interworking unit between two different networks. 
Gateway AS acts as an ordinary P2PSIP peer in P2PSIP network and an IMS 
application server in IMS network. 
As to security issue, paper [96] makes an overview of security problems in P2PSIP 
paradigm, and briefly introduces a few possible solutions. Paper [97] studies a real 
implementation of P2PSIP system under DoS attacks on DHT routing layer. The result 
shows that even in small size overlay network (only 100 peers in implementation), 
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calling service (e.g. locating a callee, etc) is significantly degraded with simple 
malicious strategy.   
2.3.4 Challenges 
Critical technological challenges within P2PSIP area are still without satisfactory 
solutions. The first one is system efficiency. Current research suggests DHT 
algorithms for P2PSIP communication. However, as technology originally proposed 
for file sharing applications, this approach is not efficient in locating peers or 
resources. For example, the delay of searching a file in P2P applications (e.g. 
BitTorrent, BitComet, etc) could be as long as several seconds to even minutes. This is 
unacceptable for P2PSIP real-time applications. Therefore, it is necessary to improve 
conventional DHT approach, or new DHT algorithms should be developed.  
Another critical issue is security. The decentralized P2P network lacks efficient 
credential mechanisms for authentication and authorization. Therefore, all the 
participating peers distrust each other, and this generates a lot of security breaches. For 
example, one malicious peer could pretend to be non-malicious peer, or it can act as an 
intermediate peer that intercepts messages and steals sensitive information. Currently, 
most of research is focused on technical availability, while ignoring security 
challenges. 
Additionally, there are few research on P2PSIP extension functions focused, for 
example, on how  interconnect with future IMS and conventional PSTN networks 
efficiently and secure, and how to enable the special entity “P2PSIP Client” nodes to 
access services. All these questions urgently need appropriate solutions.  
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Chapter 3. Improvements of P2PSIP Efficiency 
 
Chord has been suggested by IETF P2PSIP working group as 
mandatory overlay technology. However, Chord has disadvantages 
due to a few limitations. In this chapter, we investigate several 
approaches that are feasible to improve Chord lookup efficiency. 
These approaches include peer/resource lookup algorithm revision, 
geographical association, cache mechanism, hierarchical layer 
division, and routing optimization. After that, we simulate two 
systems (Chord-based and improved Chord based P2PSIP systems) 
for comparison and evaluation.  
 
3.1 BACKGROUND  
P2PSIP WG has suggested Chord protocol as a mandatory underlying overlay 
technology. Chord allows for the available peer/resource lookup in no more 
than Nlog hops, where N is the total number of peers in overlay network. In this 
overlay, each peer maintains a finger table that stores a few successors’ connections. 
Chord routes a message by sending/forwarding it to the next successor, step-by-step, 
until the destination. However, as the protocol originally designed for background 
downloading applications, Chord has several disadvantages when used to support 
P2PSIP real time services.  
Firstly, Chord lookup algorithm is unfair, especially when destination peer can be 
reached faster in anti-clockwise direction. For example, a peer is able to use one hop 
routing to access its successor, while it might take at most Nlog  hops to access its 
predecessors. This causes long delay, especially in large overlay where N  is a big 
number.  
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Secondly, existing proposals suggest use either consistent hashing (e.g. SHA-1, etc) or 
random assignment (in RELOAD proposal) to generate peer identity in order to 
partition a keyspace so that each peer is responsible for roughly the same load of 
resources. However, these algorithms are unpredictable and might cause problem that 
geographically closed peers are assigned with different IDs that are far away from 
each other in overlay space. This causes long latency when setting up the connection. 
Therefore, the investigation of efficient topology related ID generation approaches 
might be required. 
Thirdly, Chord does not define cache mechanism for preserving useful information for 
future usage (e.g. destination ID, accessible IP, port, etc). As a result, source peer has 
to initiate request each time even to frequently used destination. 
Fourth, Chord is implemented in either iterative or recursive style (described in 
Chapter 3.6). However, both approaches have drawbacks. For instance, iterative 
routing has problem in traversing NAT. Recursive routing adds extra burden to 
overlay because it generates too many message flows.  
In the following, we study several improvements that can be implemented to reduce 
connection delay, and enhance P2PSIP system efficiency. We evaluate these 
approaches based on the comparison in several aspects: number of hops, message flow, 
practical usage, and measured delay.  
3.2 LOOKUP ALGORITHM REVISION  
One simple solution is to use two-directional lookup mechanism in the search of 
peer/resource, called Bi-Chord [60, 61, 77]. In this solution, we suppose the overlay 
space size is m2 , each peer stores m successor and 1−m predecessor records in its 
Finger table. The P2PSIP request is forwarded to one of the successors/predecessors 
that is clockwisely closest to the target and then forwarded step-by-step until the 
destination is reached.  
Figure 3-1 (a) shows the connections of a peer with identifier 3.  It holds five 
connections with its successors (peer 4, peer 5, peer 7, peer 12, and peer 21) and two 
connections with its predecessors (peer 1 and peer 28). For searching a peer, for 
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instance peer 30, peer 3 firstly sends P2PSIP request to peer 28; peer 28, after 
checking its own finger table, forwards request to the destination peer 30, as 
represented in Figure 3-1 (b). 
This approach reuses most of the Chord lookup algorithm and routing style. According 
to Chord description in Chapter 2.1, it takes 2/)1)((log −N  in average before the 
message reaches destination, where N is the number of peers in the overlay.  
 
Figure  3-1: Bi-Chord Lookup 
The greedy algorithm may be implemented in future to enhance Bi-Chord efficiency. 
In this approach, each peer maintains the same Finger table as Bi-Chord (Figure 3-2). 
The major difference is that each peer transmits P2PSIP request to one of its 
successors/predecessors that is as close as possible to the destination, independent of 
the clockwise or anti-clockwise direction. Each peer chooses either its successor or 
predecessor for routing messages, on the distance basis.  
Suppose peer A wishes to initiate/forward a P2PSIP message to the destination B. It 
chooses the shortest path either through: (1) One of its predecessors closest to peer B, 
or (2) One of its successors closest to peer B. If these two choices have equal path 
lengths, the path selection will follow the second rule.  
Figure  3-2 shows an example of the Bi-Greedy lookup initiated by peer 3 and ended in 
peer 24. The message is firstly routed to peer 21 (peer 3’s successor), then to peer 25 
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(successor of peer 21), and finally to peer 24 (predecessor of 25). According to [49], 
the average path length of Bi-Greedy algorithm is  1)2/log(2/)log( +− piNN . 
 
Figure  3-2: Bi-Greedy Lookup Routing 
3.3 GEOGRAPHIC ASSOCIATION 
The current peer ID generation proposals (either consistent hashing or random 
assignment) do not consider the relationship between network topology and peer 
identifier. This results in, for example, two participating peers geographically close 
each other in network topology (for instance, behind a same NAT), are assigned with 
IDs that are far in the overlay. For setting up connection, initiated P2PSIP request has 
to travel a long distance around overlay space, with multi-hop route traversal. This 
increases delay and reduces user experience.  
In P2P file sharing research, there are already a few constructive proposals [57, 86, 
99], introducing topology awareness solutions for generating peer identities. 
Generally, we advocate this concept and suggest a few revisions on that for P2PSIP 
overlay. We propose that geographically closed peers should be assigned with 
“similar” IDs that are near in overlay space. To do that, we first advocate the point in 
RELOAD proposal that a central ID server assigns peer ID instead of consistent 
hashing algorithms. Then, a landmark ID mapping mechanism is proposed. We 
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assume there are a few landmark peers distributed evenly in the overlay, as illustrated 
in Figure 3-3. 
The peer, who wants to join the overlay, has to use its specific peer identity from 
central ID server. After receiving the request, central ID server calculates the distances 
of this peer to each landmark peer by calculating the geographical distance within 
network topology. For example, the distance D : 
|| erlandmarkpepeer IPIPD −=  
According to the calculation, central ID server computes a “nearest” landmark peer, 
and randomly picks up a unique identity (close to this landmark peer) for the applying 
peer.  
Consider for example the ID application of peer B and peer C, both of which are 
geographically “near” from the network topology point of view (with similar public 
IP). After landmark peer distance calculation, central ID server picks up two unique 
IDs near Landmark peer 3 (L3) and assigns to peer B (with ID 18) and peer C (with ID 
26). Therefore, two geographically closed peers are also close in overlay network.   
 
Figure  3-3: Central Identity Assignment 
3.4 CACHE MECHANISM  
In a conventional P2P network, cache mechanism is implemented to enhance the 
performance indirectly [34, 45, 71]. This could be reused in P2PSIP field. The concept 
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is as following: P2PSIP peer in the overlay maintains a cache that records 
communication history details, including previous communicated peer identifier, 
corresponding public IP address, port, etc. Table 3-1 shows an example of cache entry 
record (of Peer C). It records N records of communication history.  For searching 
destination peer, peer C first check its cache entry record. If the destination peer (peer 
identifier, public IP address, port, etc) is in the table, the session might be established 
directly. Otherwise, peer C will execute lookup algorithm described above.  
In stable overlay where peers do not change IDs or public endpoints frequently, the 
cost is only one hop. However, in unstable overlay where peers change their IDs/IP 
frequently, this might even cost worse delay. It takes at most Nlog1+  hops [109] (e.g. 
Bi-Chord lookup) before reaching the destination.   
Table  3-1 Cache Entry Records 
Peer C Peer Identifier Public endpoint 
1 A 215.239.168.1:1980 
2 B 159.250.16.2:8000 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
N S 128.39.169.2:9000 
3.5 HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE 
P2PSIP peer can be either fixed devices (e.g. desktop, web server, etc) with enough 
computing capabilities and high bandwidth, or it can be portable devices (e.g. mobile 
phone, PDA, laptop, etc) that have weak computing capabilities and slow Internet 
connection. Devices with weak system capabilities might cause churn problems (when 
peer joins and leaves the overlay frequently) [69] to the overlay. For instance, mobile 
phones with 3G connections might frequently join/leave overlay because of unreliable 
signal. Besides, one peer might not have enough CPU computing resources to support 
frequent P2PSIP signals, and this causes message lost. These problems might reduce 
overall overlay performance and decrease user experience.    
Separation of an overlay into different hierarchical layers might relieve above 
problems [126]. The idea is shown in Figure 3-4. We divided an overlay into three 
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sub-layers according to peer capabilities (e.g. connection type, CPU processing power, 
bandwidth, etc). Peers in the first sub-overlay are stable entities that have public IP 
addresses, powerful CPU, and stable connection. Such typical device can be a web 
server. The second sub-overlay contains peers with enough stability and processing 
power, e.g. normal PC with Internet connection. Peers in this layer do not own public 
IP address, and might relay on STUN/TURN/ICE for traversing NAT (described in 
Chapter 3.7). Peers in the lowest sub-overlay are those with unstable connections and 
less computing capabilities (e.g. mobile phones, PDA, laptops with wireless 
connection).  
Each sub-overlay contains at least one gateway for handling inter-layer 
communication.  
 
Figure  3-4: Three Layers Division Architecture 
3.6 MESSAGE ROUTING 
Generally, P2PSIP message flow in overlay network should comply with routing styles, 
for instance, Iterative or Recursive [36], both of which are supported by Chord 
technical specification. A third option “Semi-Recursive” routing is now also discussed. 
All of these approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, we 
advocate all three routing styles, and suggest different routing styles are implemented 
in different environments. 
In Iterative routing, source peer S initiates a request “I need Node C” for searching the 
destination peer C (as shown in Figure 3-5). S then is redirected by each intermediate 
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peer to the destination. In this approach, source peer is able to check validity and 
correctness of each response. It can be implemented in security sensitive environment. 
However, this solution does not provide guarantee for NAT traversal when destination 
peer is behind enterprise NAT protection. 
 
Figure  3-5: Iterative Routing 
In Recursive routing, the request is forwarded hop by hop by each intermediate peer 
until the destination. The response follows the same route back to the source (See 
Figure 3-6). Recursive routing is easy for debug and has little trouble in NAT 
traversal. However, this approach has availability and security problems. For instance, 
if any one of intermediate peers fails or leaves the overlay, the routing fails. Besides, 
source peer is unaware about security problem in case when malicious peer sitting in 
the middle exposes malicious experience (e.g. misroutes the request, etc). Therefore, 
we only suggest this approach in the use case when the other two options are not 
available or debug is needed.  
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Figure  3-6: Recursive Routing 
Another routing style is Semi-Recursive routing, which is the combination of above 
two solutions. In this approach, request message is forwarded by intermediate peers 
hop by hop to the destination, while the response is directly returned (See Figure 3-7). 
Comparing with above two solutions, this approach has the best routing efficiency 
because it greatly reduces number of message flows. Table 3-2 compares number of 
message flows between Semi-Recursive routing and Recursive (or Iterative) routing. 
Generally, the message number in recursive routing style is two times bigger than in 
Semi-Recursive (or Iterative) routing  
Table  3-2 Message Flow Comparison 
 Recursive or Iterative 
Routing 
Semi-Recursive 
Routing 
Num-of-Message 
(in worst case) Nlog2
 Nlog1+  
Num-of-Message 
(average) Nlog          Nlog2
11+  
Semi-Recursive routing approach provides better security than recursive routing since 
response is directly forwarded to source peer. It can be implemented in almost all 
environment. However, it still has NAT traversal problem when source peer is behind 
enterprise NAT environment.  
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Figure  3-7: Semi-Recursive Routing 
Therefore, for high security sensitive environment, we suggest Iterative routing; for 
efficiency sensitive environment, we suggest Semi-Recursive routing; for debugging 
sensitive environment, we suggest Recursive routing. Both Iterative and Semi-
Recursive routing styles have NAT traversal problems. Complementary functions (will 
be introduced in the following section) are required to support all three message 
routings.   
3.7 NAT TRAVERSAL 
Network Address Translators (NAT) provides benefits (e.g. reusing IP address, 
constructing home network environment, etc) as well as drawbacks. One main 
drawback is that NAT is not friendly for connection establishment between two 
endpoints. In order to solve this problem, STUN/TURN/ICE-based approaches [89, 92, 
110] have been proposed.  
STUN approach (Figure 3-8) uses a STUN server in the middle between two endpoints 
to learn the NAT status (e.g. existence of NAT, NAT type, public endpoint address, 
port, etc). With the information, two endpoints might be able to establish the session 
directly. However, STUN approach does not work in symmetric NAT (enterprise NAT 
environment with strict security rules) where an external host (outside symmetric NAT) 
can not send data packet back to an internal host before receiving a packet. 
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Figure  3-8: STUN NAT Solution 
To solve symmetric NAT traversal problem, TURN-based approach is proposed 
(Figure 3-9). TURN server is a proxy that relays data traffic between two participating 
peers during the connection and transmission. Although this might be not efficient, it 
is feasible. 
 
Figure  3-9: TURN NAT Solution 
ICE combines the usage of STUN and TURN approaches. It firstly selects STUN for 
handling, while turns to TURN if STUN is not available. Besides, ICE supports 
session negotiation (e.g. latency, jitter measurement, error handling, best route, etc) so 
that connection can be established in an optimized way.  
Another novel approach is based on Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) [27, 112]. In the 
solution, the client queries the NAT via UPnP, asking what mapping it should use if it 
wants to receive on a certain port. The NAT responds with the IP and port pair that can 
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be reached from the public Internet. Today, more and more Internet gateway vendors 
(e.g. D-Link, Intel, Arescom, etc) offer the support of UPnP protocol, which makes 
this technology quite promising for P2PSIP communication systems.  
3.8 IMPLEMENTATION  
3.8.1 Implementation Model  
Our implementation layer architecture is illustrated in Figure 3-10. P2P layer is 
defined to be an application layer protocol, handling overlay activities. It includes 
Topology Plugin component for overlay maintenance and diagnose, Storage 
component for data storage, and Link Management component for connections 
management and initiation. Besides, we propose Security Enhancement component for 
providing security mechanisms (will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
SIP related usage, called “P2PSIP”, is built upon P2P layer. P2PSIP layer combines 
SIP functionality as well as part of P2P functionality. Let us consider an example 
presented in Figure 3-11. The major difference with SIP “INVITE” (Figure 3-11(a)) is 
that P2PSIP message ((Figure 3-11(b))) replaces SIP URI by peer ID (for instance, 
alice@atlanta.com is changed to id 20, and bob@biloxi.com is changed to id 3). Based 
on overlay understandable identity, Message Transport component is capable to 
send/forward request to a downstream peer. The message route (e.g. ID, public IP, port, 
etc) useful for routing and debugging is recorded in “Via” header.  
Session negotiation services, such as ICE based NAT traversal, etc., are supposed to 
be handled by SIP related protocol, more precisely, by P2PSIP request message. The 
negotiation parameter can be included in SIP extension header, or encapsulated in SDP 
body (can be XML based). Besides, security mechanisms should be also implemented 
in P2PSIP usage layer (discussed in Chapter 5).  
In this approach, P2P layer handles overlay maintenance functions, while P2PSIP 
layer is responsible for session negotiation, message routing. We believe this division 
preserves SIP original functions. Also, due to close relationship between P2PSIP and 
SIP messages, it would not be difficult to handle translation tasks when 
interconnecting with SIP based network.   
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Figure  3-10: Implementation Layer Architecture 
 
  
Figure  3-11: P2PSIP Request 
Besides, a corresponding P2PSIP “180 Ringing” is defined as the success response. An 
example of such success response is presented below:   
P2PSIP/2.0 180 Ringing 
To: 20 
From: 3 
Contact: 20 
CSeq: 1 Response 
Content-Length: 0 
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Via: 3 192.168.0.101:9003; 20 192.168.0.101:9020 
3.8.2 Implementation Description 
The implementation is built with respect to the following assumptions: 
• Overlay space is defined in the range of [0, 2047]. We randomly pick up 512 
numbers as peer IDs of 512 peers. This simplifies ID generation algorithm and 
makes graphical presentation more understandable. 
• Overlay maintenance activities (join/leave the overlay) are not considered and 
implemented. Peers in the overlay are supposed to be stable.   
• Peer’s neighbours are pre-configured manually in the background database.  
• NAT traversal solutions are not implemented. 
Firstly, we simulate a Chord-based P2PSIP system. This system contains 512 P2PSIP 
peers in the overlay with overlay space size 2048. We use Java to create an application 
that contains 512 threads, each of which represents one P2PSIP peer. We configure 
successors for each peer in a background database so that in initiation phase, peers 
could fetch their specific finger tables.   
A P2PSIP Peer management center is used to create P2PSIP peer threads and 
configure the peer attributes (e.g. peerID and the opening port). Each peer uses the 
loopback address (127.0.0.1) as its IP address (can be also 192.168.0.100 in NAT) and 
opens a specific port (we set it as 9000+peerID) for receiving the requests.  
For each P2PSIP Peer thread, it is able to send out “INVITE” message when clicking 
“Search” button and receive the response in the background.  
Then, based on Chord-based P2PSIP system, we build an improved system with the 
feature of Bi-Chord, Cache entry record, and Semi-Recursive routing. The Chord 
lookup protocol is revised to realize Bi-Chord; the open source Apache Derby [2] is 
chosen as the embedded database for cache entry record implementation; finally the 
routing style is changed to Semi-Recursive routing. Note we do not implement the 
concept of hierarchical layer division because peers are assumed to be stable.  
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Two systems are deployed separately on a platform with Windows XP professional 
system, 2*2.4G Intel Core CPU and 3G memory. We use the Wireshark [29] to 
monitor the message transmission.    
3.9 EVALUATION 
Our evaluation is based on geographic association model (Figure 3-12), in which 
geographically related peers are assigned with IDs that are near in the overlay. We 
assume that the overlay is divided logically into S equal parts and peer M only 
communicate with peers in parts A and D.  
 
Figure  3-12: Evaluation Model 
3.9.1 Model Analysis   
According to [109], Chord lookup protocol need in average Nlog
2
1
 number of hops to 
reach a destination peer, where N
 
is the number of peers in the overlay. Assume the 
destination peer is within the area A (that is only S/1  part of overlay), it takes )log(
2
1
S
N
 
number of hops in average for the source peer M to route the message. 
 Also according to Chord standard [109], it takes Slog  hops before the message 
arrives to the left boundary of area D. Therefore, the average number of hops when 
source peer M will reach a peer in the area D is: 
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Since Bi-Chord algorithm provides fairness in bi-directional peer/resource lookup, the 
average number of hops is )log(
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S
N
 in both area A and D.  
Bi-Greedy further improves lookup efficiency. According to previous research [49], 
the average number of hops is:                                                 
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We compare three lookup algorithms by setting different S value (e.g. we set S = 8 and 
S = 16 for example), as represented in Figure 3-13. X axis represents the peer number 
in the overlay and Y axis represents the number of hops in average. We get the 
information that firstly, Bi-Chord and Bi-Greedy lookup algorithms are much more 
efficient than the original Chord lookup; secondly, the higher value of S, the smaller 
number of hops; thirdly, Bi-Greedy approach provides better result than Bi-Chord.  
 
Figure  3-13: Three Algorithms Comparison 
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3.9.2 Feasibility   
Bi-Chord approach preserves most of the original Chord lookup and routing 
mechanisms. It should be easy to implement in reality. However, Bi-Greedy does not 
always better. The enhancement of Bi-Greedy algorithm is limited comparing with Bi-
Chord (about one hop difference). Additionally, the malicious peer in Bi-Greedy 
approach will be able to send/forward the message in both directions and makes the 
debug and trace even more difficult. Furthermore, the additional functionality to 
accurate distance calculation and comparison might on the other way, add the burden 
for P2PSIP peer and offset the enhancement of Bi-Greedy. In summary, we advocate 
Bi-Chord approach.  
Cache record entry approach is a common solution in today’s applications and systems 
for recording useful data, e.g. communication history, etc.  
3.9.3 Delay Testing 
Finally, the delays in two systems are measured. We choose one peer (here we use 
peer 586 for example) as the source peer and select 8 destination peer groups, each of 
which contains 32 random selected peers in either district A or D. (We assume that 
S=8 and therefore both of district A and D have 64 P2PSIP peers). For each system, 
we initiate 32*8 P2PSIP requests (from group 1 to group 8) manually from peer 586 
and measure the delays of the responses. After that, we calculate the average delay for 
each group, as represented in Figure 3-14.  
In Chord-based P2PSIP system, the delay of each group is almost the same (about 
15ms-16ms); however, in the improved Chord based P2PSIP system, the delay is 
greatly reduced, especially when the number of testing increases. We believe it is the 
contribution of the Cache entry records.   
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Figure  3-14: Delay Comparison 
3.10 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we study several approaches to improve peer/resource lookup 
efficiency of Chord protocol. After considering all aspects, we came to conclusion that 
the combination of Bi-Chord, Cache entry record, Geographical association, and Semi-
Recursive routing might be one of the best options for P2PSIP systems to reduce 
number of hops and delay during session initiation. 
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Chapter 4. Security Challenge of P2PSIP  
 
Security is one of biggest challenges in P2PSIP systems. The 
decentralized nature of P2P comes to the cost of reduced 
manageability and therefore causes security problems, e.g. 
distrust, privacy leaks, unpredictable availability, etc. This 
chapter introduces security problems, including general security 
problems and P2P specific problems; and then suggests possible 
solutions suggested.  
 
4.1 GENERIC SECURITY PROBLEMS 
Generic security problems are vulnerabilities appearing in the most of networking 
systems. In the following, we specify three kinds of generic security problems. 
Denial-Of-Service attack 
Denial-Of-Service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable 
to its intended users [80]. Generally, DoS attack is implemented by either forcing the 
target to reset or consuming its resource so that the victim is not able to offer intended 
services. In P2PSIP network, a malicious peer could flood a multitude of P2PSIP 
request to one or more peers. This might consume the computing resource or prevent 
legitimate network traffic. The flooding can be also overlay maintenance packets, 
which might endanger overlay performance.  
Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) [78] is the evolution of DoS when a multitude 
of compromised systems are involved into the attack. DDoS attack depends on a wide 
range of victim machines remote controlled by malicious program, called “Trojan 
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horse” [23]. The “Trojan horse” can be remotely activated and direct an attack to a 
certain peers or a part of overlay network.  
DoS and DDoS attacks are big issues to most of network systems. Efficient credential 
mechanism is able to reduce these attacks; however, it is difficult to eliminate them.  
Man-in-the-middle Attack 
Man-in-the middle (MiM) attack [83] is a form of active eavesdropping. It might 
happen when an attacker impersonates enough sensitive information (e.g. IP, port, 
secret, etc) of endpoints that are talking each other. The attacker splits a normal 
connection into two separate tunnels, however, makes victims believe they are talking 
over a private connection, as illustrated in Figure 4-1. After that, the attacker M is 
capable to intercept all the messages going between two victims and send whatever 
response he wants.  
In P2PSIP network, each participating peer must help each other in routing and 
storage. This gives great opportunity for malicious intermediate peer to invade privacy 
of other peers. The information can be used to initiate MiM attack during interaction 
of victims.   
Appropriate authentication mechanisms should be implemented to reduce the impact 
of this attack.  
 
Figure  4-1: Example of Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
Worm Propagation 
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Worm [107] is a self-replicating malware computer program. It spreads by exploiting 
vulnerabilities in software or operating systems. Worms propagating through P2P 
systems and applications might be disastrous. Since all the computers in P2P network 
are running the same (or similar) software, an attacker might compromise the entire 
overlay by finding only one exploitable security breach. Besides, it is much easier to 
propagate worm application because each P2P peer maintains a list of neighbouring 
peers, and these peers are considered trusted each other. Moreover, most peers are 
personal computers in real life, therefore, worm program is more likely to catch person 
private data (e.g. credit card numbers, user name, passwords, etc), which is attractive 
to attackers.     
4.2 P2P SPECIFIC SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Besides generic secure threats, P2PSIP systems also face specific security problems 
caused by P2P decentralized nature or specific functions proposed. Security problems 
include identity attack, overlay attack, data attack, Spam over Internet (SPIT), and 
other malicious behaviour. In this section, we specify these attacks.  
4.2.1 Identity Attacks  
To participate in the overlay, each peer applies its unique identity (for instance, 
received from an E&A centralized server). However, such identity might be misused. 
Following are description of such identity-based attacks. 
1) Sybil attack [46] 
A malicious attacker can create many identities and use them to join the overlay 
network. If these identities become valid, they can gain control on a part of the 
network. These malicious entities are capable to compromise the network through 
malicious behaviours (e.g. compromise message routing, delete storage, etc). 
2) Eclipse attack [100] 
Eclipse attack is closely related to Sybil attack. Intermediate peers can conspire to 
hijack and dominate the neighbour set of correct peers by controlling the data traffic 
through routing. 
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3) Identity hijack [96] 
Source peer sends out a request by forwarding the request to its neighbour peer who is 
nearest to the destination. However, a malicious neighbour is capable to intercept 
request message and responds to source that he is the destination peer. By pretending 
to be destination peer, the attacker can hijack a connection at setup time.   
4.2.2 Overlay attacks 
Overlay functions include maintenance activities, such as peer join/leave management, 
routing table construction and updates, link management, etc. A malicious peer might 
exploit vulnerability of these operations and initiate malicious attacks. 
1) Free ridding [96, 114] 
Malicious peer might use P2PSIP services while refuse to provide reasonable 
contribution to overlay. For example, it might refuse to relay message for the other 
peers, which causes message lost. Also, it might refuse storage request from other 
peers by reducing/deleting its storage cache.   
2) Join-leave attack [96] 
Joining and leaving overlay would generate a series of maintenance messages to 
neighbouring peers (for example, notification to successors and predecessors to update 
their routing table). A malicious peer might compromise the overlay by generating and 
distributing a multitude of join-leave messages to confuse the overlay, and consume 
the resource of neighbouring peers.  
4.2.3 Data Attacks 
Let us consider a typical malicious behaviour model in Figure 4-2, which represents a 
typical P2PSIP session initiation interaction between source peer A and destination 
peer D. There are non-malicious peer (the cat B) and malicious peer (the panda C) as 
the intermediate peers. This example illustrates the following possible security related 
behaviour. 
1) Data Temper 
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For example, peer C is capable to drop, misroute, and modify the message it received.  
2) Replay Attacks 
The malicious peer can retransmit the previous message to confuse the overlay or 
replace newer data with old information. 
3) Privacy leaks 
Let us take a look at an example of possible “P2PSIP INVITE” message presented on 
Figure 4-3. The “From” header indicates the source peer identity; the “To” header 
shows the destination peer identity; the “Via” header stores the identity/address of 
previous intermediate peers. This information may cause privacy violation. For 
instance, malicious peer C is capable to record a profile of source and destination peers 
(e.g. Identifier, IP, Port, etc.) through parsing the incoming P2PSIP messages. This 
information can be used to initiate a DoS attack on a peer or overlay network. It might 
also be sold to illegal advertisement parties, which results in spam messages and calls. 
 
Figure  4-2: A Malicious Behaviour Model 
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Figure  4-3: An example of P2PSIP Request 
4.2.4 SPIT Attacks  
Similarly to junk mail (or SPAM), SPAM over Internet Telephony (SPIT) [94] greatly 
degrades user experience. SPIT can be generated by an advertising agent who 
randomly selects a party to call for advertisements. The impact of this attack primarily 
depends on resources available to the advertising agency (e.g. the number of 
employees, etc). Another type of SPIT can be generated by computer software. It 
systematically or randomly selects one or more parties and transmits pre-recorded 
advertising message once connection is established. This annoys users because P2PSIP 
based devices might ring anytime.  
As a type of synchronous communication, SPIT is more difficult to prevent than 
traditional asynchronous E-mail systems because there is not as much time to apply 
filter mechanism during communication establishment.  
4.2.5 Other threats 
Anonymity [96] 
P2P systems allow anonymity during communication. The easiest way to do this is just 
hide source identifier in P2PSIP request. However, the destination peer, who does not 
know the source, might regard such request as malicious and refuse to receive it.  
Lawful interception [95] 
A Lawful Interception activity gets triggered by a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) 
which authorises a Network Operator, Access Provider, or Service Provider to 
intercept traffic for a target identity. Lawful interception in P2PSIP systems, to some 
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degree, damages the privacy because all information, including source identity, 
destination identity, calls duration, and other signalling are intercepted.  
4.3 SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
To overcome security threats, a few approaches have been suggested. However, these 
approaches are not capable to completely eliminate the problems but they relieve 
them.  
4.3.1 Certificate based security 
Public Key infrastructure (PKI) based certificate is supposed to be implemented [41]. 
Certificate is issued by a credential server, which is the Certification Authority (CA) 
that might collocate with enrolment server (as illustrated in Figure 4-4). It proves the 
existence and legitimacy of the specific peer so that the communication session is 
trustful. In addition to a few basic elements (e.g. version number, signature algorithm, 
digital signature of the issuer, etc), P2PSIP peer certificate might include P2PSIP 
related information: peer specific ID and one or more user names (e.g. 
alice@operator.com, etc). Public and private keys are used to handle the task of 
encryption and decryption.  
 
Figure  4-4: PKI Certificate Architecture 
Another usage of certificate is for digital signature. Since the ownership of the private 
key is bound to a specific peer, a valid signature proves that the message is sent by this 
peer.  
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4.3.2 Pre-Shared Key Based Security 
In closed or ephemerals network, pre-shared key (PSK) approach [47] can be more 
convenient. Pre-shared keys are symmetric keys shared among the peers in advance to 
establish secure connection. It can be a password like “hElLo#QWoRld”, a passphrase 
like “Wo ai ni”, or a hexadecimal string like “AUS30209-DOP745”. The secret is used 
by all the peers in the overlay to secure data traffic among each other. The PSK 
exchange algorithm is described below: 
1. Client (request peer) send a “ClientHello” Message to the server (organized peer), 
indicating its willingness to use pre-shared key authentication. “ClientHello” 
message also includes one or more PSK ciphersuites it supports. 
2. The server generates a “ServerHelloDone” message by placing one of the PSK 
ciphersuites and an appropriate ServerKeyExchange message (multi pre-shared key 
choices), and sends to the client side.  
3. The client includes a ClientKeyExchange message (showing which key to choose) 
in the “Finished” message and sends to the server. 
4. Server returns a “Finished” acknowledgement. 
Using pre-shared keys can help to avoid the need for public key operations, which is 
especially efficient if security solution (e.g. TLS, etc) is implemented in performance-
constrained environment with limited CPU computing capability. Besides, it is more 
convenient to configure a PSK than to use certificate since in closed environments 
connections are configured mostly manually in advance. However, pre-shared key can 
only provide limited security. For instance, an attacker could initiate a DoS attack by 
sending a larger mount of exchange key request to a peer. Also, it lacks efficient 
mechanisms to prevent MiM and replay attacks.   
4.4 EXISTING SECURITY CHALLENGES  
P2PSIP paradigm still faces serious security breaches. PKI approach is capable to 
reduce generic security threats (such as DoS attack, MITM attack, etc). Its 
authentication mechanism also reduces identity attacks (e.g. sybil, eclipse, etc). 
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However, certificate does not protect the system from overlay attacks, data attacks, 
SPIT attacks and other malicious kinds of behaviours. For example, a malicious peer 
might pretend to be non-malicious and get legal certificate. After that, it is able to join 
the overlay and expose many kinds of malicious behaviours. Generally, all 
participating peers in P2PSIP system should distrust each other (at least in the 
beginning).     
Therefore, to provide security guarantee, it is necessary to explore some approaches 
that could either improve the trustworthiness level among participating peers or 
prevent malicious peers for exposing malicious experience. In the next chapter, we 
study a few possible approaches to improve the P2PSIP system security. 
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Chapter 5. Security Enhancement of P2PSIP  
 
The key security problem is the distrust among participating 
P2PSIP peers. In order to solve the problem, this chapter 
describes three solutions for security enhancement during 
P2PSIP session establishment. These solutions include: proxy 
based security, subjective logic based trust enhancement, and the 
combination of these two. The corresponding use scenarios are 
also described.  
 
5.1. PROXY BASED SECURITY 
Proxy based architecture is used in a huge variety of networking systems and 
applications. A proxy is an intermediary entity that intercepts communication and 
performs necessary services on behalf of network system. In most cases, proxy acts as 
a protocol translator, content adapter, security and privacy provider.  
The original intention of P2PSIP is to eliminate the need of centralized entities. 
However, researchers begin to realize that this is not trivial, especially when 
considering security issues. Due to the distrust among participating peers, the session 
initiation process from the beginning and the subsequent data traffic are distrusted and 
insecure.  
In this section, a possible proxy based security framework is proposed. The proposed 
proxy solution should, on one hand protect security and privacy, and on the other hand 
not add much burden in system efficiency. Proxy entities must be assumed pre-
configured and pre-exist at the backbone of overlay.  
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5.1.1 Proxy-based Architecture 
Our proposed architecture involves three main parts: P2PSIP Peer, Resource, Chord 
Secure Proxy (CSP), as shown in Figure 5-1.  
P2PSIP peer, which can be a mobile phone, laptop, PC, etc., is connected to the 
Internet. Resource is the data value stored in a particular peer. Each peer and resource 
is identified by an integer ID. Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) is the secure and trusted 
proxy server as well as a preconfigured P2PSIP peer in the overlay. 
For locating a peer/resource in the overlay, the source peer first sends P2PSIP request 
to a specific CSP that is the nearest to the destination. We logically regard this part of 
the network as source network (Step 1). The CSP acts as a proxy server to probe the 
existence of the destination peer and securely forward P2PSIP request message to the 
destination peer (Step 2). We logically consider this part of network as the destination 
network. After locating the destination peer, the connection can be established (Step 3).  
Note that all the connections are SSL/TLS secured.  
 
Figure  5-1: Proxy-based Architecture Overview 
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Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) is the key inter-working unit, acting as a bridge between 
source peer and destination peer. It is deployed as P2PSIP application server with the 
functionality of a normal P2PSIP peer. There are four main components inside a CSP 
unit (see Figure 5-2): 
• Source inter-working. This part receives P2PSIP request from source peer. 
Based on security requirement in the request, source inter-working component 
chooses corresponding handling strategy.   
• Policy management. This part is the decision center to decide which type of 
secure service should be handled. Inside this component, there is a policy 
database recording all the policy items. 
• Encryption & Decryption. This component helps CSP to encrypt outgoing 
messages and decrypt incoming messages. 
• Destination Inter-working. Destination inter-working component is the portal 
function that probes destination peer, and forwards the P2PSIP request. The UA 
subcomponent acts as normal P2PSIP peer; B2BUA subcomponent handles the 
secure services in the destination network. 
 
Figure  5-2: Chord Secure Proxy Internals 
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5.1.2 Security     
The communications in the source network and the destination network should be 
securely encrypted. P2PSIP WG [38] has suggested PKI-based certificate approach to 
provide security guarantees and functionalities such as encryption, decryption, digital 
signature, etc. This can be reused in our proposed system.  
5.1.3 Source Inter-working 
Source Inter-working component contains an overlay container for receiving P2PSIP 
requests. With the assistance of Encryption & Decryption component, it is able to 
encrypt the outgoing response and decrypt the arriving requests. Besides, based on 
secure requirement from the message, Inter-working component turns to Policy 
Management component for the corresponding handling mechanism and delivers the 
message to the corresponding component in destination Inter-working component. 
Moreover, source inter-working component is responsible to response with the error 
code if exception happens in source network (e.g. the request message is in bad format; 
secure service request is not understood, etc).  
5.1.4 Policy Management  
Policy management contains a policy database that stores requirement items of how to 
handle the secure services. A new P2PSIP extension header is defined to include the 
secure service requirement from the P2PSIP peers. The secure header starts with a 
header field “Secure”, and follows the corresponding value. We suggest that the 
system should at least support three types of different secure services: 
"none" / "critical" / “anonymous” 
where 
none means that the user requests no security  for this message request regardless of 
any pre-provisioned profile or default requirement of the device. The overlay peer can 
specify this option when the system does not require secure service. 
critical indicates that the secure services are critical in the session. The CSP should 
ensure the data confidentiality, integrity, and hide source privacy before the 
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destination peer is authenticated. The request should be rejected if service can not be 
supported.  
anonymous value requests that the CSP should hide all the source sensitive privacy 
information from the other peers, including the destination peer. The request should be 
rejected if service can not be supported. 
5.1.5 Destination Network  
We logically define destination network that represents the connections from the 
specific CSP to the destination peer. The idea is that CSP multicasts “HelloRequest” 
message (similar with ICMP message [84]) to CSP’s successors in the anti-clockwise 
direction of the destination peer. These successors forward the received 
“HelloRequest” based on the original Chord lookup mechanism until they reach the 
destination peer. This causes that the destination peer might receive several identical 
“HelloRequest” messages from different routes in a certain time period. Then, the 
destination peer randomly chooses one of the routes and return “HelloResponse” to the 
specific CSP. The “HelloRequest” and “HelloResponse” message can be sent by either 
TCP or UDP. 
Multicast mechanism causes more data traffic than the original Chord lookup. 
However, it on the other hand makes the system more resilient to the failure and 
malicious experience (e.g. discard, misroute, temper, modify the received message, etc) 
of the intermediate peer. 
We define the structure of “HelloRequest” and “HelloResponse” messages (See Figure 
5-3 and Figure 5-4) that include three fields (TOS, Code, Checksum) and five fields of 
P2P information (Call-ID, CSP Identifier, CSP public address and port, Destination 
Identifier). In the “HelloResponse” message, two more fields (Destination peer public 
address and port) are added. The descriptions of these fields are as following:  
TOS: describes the service type of this message. For instance, we can define 8 as the 
“HelloRequest” and 0 as the “HelloResponse”.  
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Code: this is the further specification of the “Hello” message. For example, an 
unreachable destination might have this field set from 1 to 15. Each different number 
represents different error types.  
Checksum: this field contains error checking of data from the whole “Hello” message.  
Call-ID: a random number for identify “Hello” message. 
CSP Identifier: an Integer ID of CSP. 
CSP Public IP Address: public accessible address of CSP. 
CSP port: public accessible port of CSP. 
Destination peer Identifier: P2PSIP ID of destination peer. 
Destination Public IP Address: public accessible address of destination peer. 
Destination port: public accessible port of the destination Peer. 
 
 
Figure  5-3: "HelloRequest" Message Format 
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Figure  5-4: "HelloResponse" Message Format 
5.1.6 Use Scenarios  
Use case 1 (see Figure 5-5) describes the P2PSIP communication establishment 
process between source peer A and destination peer B. Possible messages flows are: 
1) Source peer sends the P2PSIP “INVITE” message to a specific CSP that is the 
clockwise nearest to the destination peer. 
2) CSP multicasts a “HelloRequest” message to a few successors before the 
destination. Intermediate peers forward the “HelloRequest” to the next hop, step 
by step, until the destination. 
3) Destination peer receives several identical “HelloRequest”, and randomly 
chooses one of them. Then a “HelloResponse” is returned to CSP. 
4) CSP forwards P2PSIP “INVITE” message to the destination peer. 
5) Destination peer returns a P2PSIP “180 Ringing” to the source peer.  
6) Session negotiation and establishment. 
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Figure  5-5: A Communication establishment use scenario 
Figure 5-6 shows a use scenario with a malicious or compromised peer allocated in the 
destination network to interfere the message flow. Malicious/compromised peer 
(represent as a panda) is capable to discard, misroute, temper, and eavesdrop the data 
received. However, CSP-based system is tolerant to the malicious behaviour and 
guarantees the system availability because CSP multicast mechanism increases the 
surviving rate of “HelloRequest” messages. Possible interaction can be as following: 
1) Source peer sends the P2PSIP “INVITE” message to a specific CSP that is 
responsible for the destination peer. 
2) CSP multicasts “HelloRequest” message to probe the destination. A few 
messages might be received by the malicious intermediate peer and thus is 
possible to be discarded, misrouted, tempered, etc. However, the others are 
routed to the destination peer B. 
3) Destination peer receives several identical “HelloRequest”, and randomly 
chooses one of them for handling. Then a “HelloResponse” is returned to the 
specific CSP. 
4) CSP forwards P2PSIP “INVITE” message to the destination peer. 
5) Destination peer returns a P2PSIP “180 Ringing” back to the source peer.  
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6) Session can be negotiated and established. 
 
Figure  5-6: Malicious Interference Scenario 
5.1.7 Evaluation  
We evaluate the proposed system from several aspects: theoretical analysis, delay 
testing, and the implementation of a typical malicious use scenario.  
Theoretical Analysis 
In Chord-based system, the average number of hops is Nlog21  [109], where N is the 
number of peers in the overlay (as described in Chapter 2). Assuming that there are S 
CSPs that splitting the overlay into S parts evenly, the average number of hops 
between CSP and destination peer (for instance, CSP(i) to peer B in Figure 5-5) is: 
)/log(21 SN  
Adding one hop connection to source network, the average number of hops in CSP-
based overlay is:  
1)/log(21 +SN  
The comparison in Figure 5-7 (we select S=16 and S=32 for illustration) shows that 
CSP-based system reduces the number of hops comparing with original Chord-based 
system. Besides, the more CSPs are in the overlay, the less hops are needed (in 
average).  
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Figure  5-7: Comparison of Number of Hops 
Delay Measurement 
We also measure the delay in CSP based overlay. Peer 586 is set to be the source peer 
that sends out P2PSIP request to 100 random destination peers. We measure the time 
period between sending out request “P2PSIP INVITE” and receiving the response 
“180 Ringing”, and get the average delay 62ms. This is much higher than Chord-based 
overlay (16ms as described in Figure 3-14 in Chapter 3).  
We believe that this is because destination peer in CSP-based system should wait a 
certain period of time for receiving multiple “HelloRequest” requests. (For instance, 
we set it to 30ms.) Besides, the data traffic caused by multicast might increase the 
burden of the system and therefore increase the delay.   
Malicious Interference Use Scenario 
 
We implement a typical malicious use scenario to show that CSP-based system 
architecture is able to protect the networks from the security breaches coming from the 
compromised or malicious peers.  
We initiate a P2PSIP request from peer 586, searching for the destination peer 1618 
(as shown in Figure 5-8). In Chord system, the message flow should go through Peer 
586 -> peer 1100 -> peer 1613 -> peer 1617-> peer 1618. Then, we set the 
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intermediate peer 1617 as a malicious/compromised intermediate peer that might 
discard, misroute, revise or temper the data message. Therefore, it is not possible to 
locate the destination peer in original Chord-based systems.  
However, this is different in CSP-based system. The request would be directed to the 
CSP 1536. Then “HelloRequest” is distributed by multicasting and therefore causes 
several routes. Although one of the routes is interfered by malicious peer 1617 (the red 
route in Figure 5-9), two others (green and black routes) can still reach the destination 
peer. Finally, the destination peer could randomly pick up the black or the green route 
for handling.  
 
Figure  5-8: A Malicious Interference Use Scenario 
5.1.8 Summary 
In this section we have proposed a proxy-based secure architecture for P2PSIP session 
initiation. The system architecture resolves several issues including security, source 
inter-working, policy management, message transaction, destination inter-working. 
We use the implementation to show feasibility of this solution. Also, the evaluation 
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shows that this system offers protection of the network from the 
compromised/malicious peers.   
P2PSIP aims to build decentralized communication systems without (or with limited) 
help of centralized server. However, the proposed system model breaks (slightly) the 
original concept of P2PSIP. During the research, we realize that it is difficult for 
P2PSIP system to provide secure services without any centralized trusted entities. 
Therefore, our proposed system model is the compromise between theory and reality.   
However, no system is completely secure. It is possible that some of P2PSIP multicast 
messages are received by malicious intermediate peers. This might make destination 
peer confusing in selecting a route. Even worse, if these multicast messages are all 
intercepted by a few malicious peers, the system availability would be greatly 
jeopardized. Therefore, a few extra mechanisms (e.g. subjective based trust [65, 82]) 
should be further integrated to select the most trustful route. We consider one such 
possible approach in the next section. 
5.2. TRUST-BASED SECURITY APPROACH 
Research efforts to improve P2PSIP trustworthiness are mostly based on PKI-based 
certificate approaches that have been proposed in the literature [37, 59]. In this 
approach, certificates are issued by a Certification Authority (CA). Certificates prove 
the existence and legitimacy of the specific peers. 
Reputation system can be another approach to provide distributed trust. A reputation 
system collects, distributes, and aggregates feedback about participants’ past 
behaviour. Several typical approaches for P2P distributed system are described in [67, 
98, 106]. The idea of these approaches is similar: the reputation is represented as the 
discrete reputation value (e.g. 1 represents good reputation and 0 represents bad 
reputation). In P2PSIP services, the reputation can be earned by contributing P2P 
services, for instance, delivering the data traffic for the other peers, acting as the 
STUN server, etc. A peer with good reputation behaves as expected and thus is 
trustworthy, while a malicious peer that does not behave as expected will get low 
reputation score, and thus is less trustworthy. Usually, the impact of malicious 
experience is greater than positive experience. Figure 5-10 [111] shows a typical 
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example how the reputation value is influenced by positive and negative experiences. 
From the time 1 to 5, the reputation value increases due to the good behaviour. 
However, the value decreases a lot (more than the sum of the previous 5 steps) in time 
6 when the peer demonstrates bad behaviour. Steps 7-10 illustrate the positive 
experiences, however with lower increasing rate of trustworthiness value than during 
steps 1-5.   
 
 
Figure  5-9: Trust based Security  
In this section, we propose a novel trust-awareness based security enhancement 
approach. The proposed solution is based on subjective logic trust calculation, which 
on one hand absorbs advantages of reputation system (for instance, encourage and 
punishment mechanism), on the other hand offers more realistic and precise effect than 
traditional reputation system. The system model can be integrated with PKI-based 
certificate approach for enhancement of security during P2PSIP communication. In 
next section we describe subjective logic first proposed in [63, 64, 81]  and then use it 
in the following sections as metric for determining trustworthiness of message 
transaction flow. 
5.2.1 Subjective Logic    
Papers [63, 64] define the term opinion, denotedω , which expresses an opinion about 
trustworthiness level. Let t, d and u be such that, 1] [0,},,{ ∈udt
 
and 1=++ udt
. 
Then a triple },,{ udt=ω  is called an opinion where components t, d and u
 
represent 
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levels of trust, distrust and uncertainty respectively. For example, trustworthiness 
level associated with distrust could be expressed as opinion }05.0,95.0,0{1 =ω , but 
trustworthiness level associated with high level of trust could be expressed as opinion 
}11.0,00.0,89.0{2 =ω . By varying these parameters one can express several levels of 
trust. The level of trustworthiness can be defined based on context and properties of 
peers, Expressing trust by using three parameters instead of one simple trust level 
gives more adequate trust model of real world since when different opinions are 
combined these parameters are treated differently. 
The subjective logic defines a set of logical operators for combining opinions such that 
conjunction, recommendation, consensus, etc [63, 64]. Let },,{ BpBpBpBp udt=ω  denote an 
opinion of peer B about logical statement p. In context of this section B is a P2PSIP 
peer in the overlay and statement p may be a statement that “data received by B are 
unchanged”. 
Assume that a peer A has an opinion },,{ ABABABAB udt=ω  about trustworthiness of 
recommendations given by peer B. Since entity A does not have any direct opinion 
A
pω when the message arrives via peer B, it will try to deduce the indirect opinion 
about trustworthiness of p, denoted ABpω , based on recommendation (opinion Bpω ) 
given by B. For this purpose the recommendation operator ⊗  is introduced as follows. 
},,{ ABpABpABpBpABABp udt=⊗= ωωω  
where 
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5.2.2 Subjective Logic based Architecture  
In this section we propose a subject logic based trust architecture. The proposed 
architecture involves three main parts: P2PSIP Peer, Resource, and Secure Opinion 
Server (SOS), as shown in Figure 5-11. P2PSIP peer is connected to the Internet. 
Security Enhancement of P2PSIP  
 69 
Resource is the data value stored in a specific peer. Secure Opinion Server (SOS) is 
the trust management server that stores and computes the dynamic opinion for each 
P2PSIP peer. 
To locate a peer/resource, the source peer first multicasts P2PSIP request to a certain 
number of successors which are in the anti-clockwise direction of the destination peer. 
Intermediate peers forward the received request step by step until the destination peer 
is reached. Finally, the destination peer might receive multiple request messages, and 
it turns to the SOS server for selecting the most trustful one. After that, the session 
between source peer and destination peer could be securely established.  
 
Figure  5-10: Subjective Logic Trust Model 
Secure Opinion Server (SOS) is the key inter-working unit, acting as a decision maker 
for the destination peer. Note that SOS can be either collocated inside the Enrolment 
and Authentication (E&A) server or as a separate unit. It contains three components 
(see Figure 5-12): 
• Connection handling receives the RPC (Remote Procedure Call) request 
message (that contains a list of routing options), and generates the 
corresponding response.  
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• Opinion computation is responsible to calculate the opinion of each message 
flow based on the subjective logic rules. Besides, it updates the opinion for each 
peer periodically (according to the rules defined in Section 5.2.4).  
• Opinion DB is a component that stores current opinion about trustworthiness of 
each P2PSIP peer.  
                   
Figure  5-11: Secure Opinion Server (SOS) Internals 
5.2.3 Opinion Calculation  
The following will demonstrate opinion calculation based on subjective logic rules. 
Suppose that a request goes from the source peer A, through intermediate peers 1B , 2B , 
1−nB , and to the destination peer nB . Let p denote as “data received by nB  is 
unchanged”. By applying the rules of subjective logic described in Section 5.2.1, the 
trustworthiness of this data delivered through this route can be calculated as following: 
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Based on the opinion result, we introduce another parameter v that represents the final 
score of a specific message transmission. The higher value of v, the higher 
trustworthiness of the message flow. We define v in the following: 
dutv 2)2/1( −+=
 
5.2.4 Opinion Maintenance 
SOS is the secure server that stores the opinion for each peer in the overlay. We define 
the Initial Opinion (IOP) as the first opinion when peer joins the overlay for the first 
time. The Secure Opinion Server (SOS) assigns the IOP based on the system 
capabilities of the peer, such as available processing power (p), memory (m), 
bandwidth (b), etc. For instance, the rule could be as following: 
• Initiative distrust value is: d=0. 
• If the available processing is larger than 200MHZ, p=(1/6); otherwise, 
p=(1/6)*(processing/200M). 
• If bandwidth is larger than 300k, b=(1/6); otherwise, 
b=(1/6)*(bandwidth/300k). 
• If memory is larger than 100M, m = (1/6); otherwise, m=(1/6)*(free 
memory/100M). 
• Initial trust value is: t=p+b+m, if p+b+m<0.5, otherwise, t=0.5. 
• Initial uncertainty value is: u=1-t. 
The opinion is dynamically updated according to the behaviour of each peer. It may 
increase in some rate according to the contribution of the overlay (e.g. act as the 
intermediate peer to relay the traffic, etc) or degrade when there is no contribution (for 
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example, nothing happened during some time period). The encouragement rules could 
be as following: 
• When the peer acts as an intermediate peer that relays the data traffic, the trust t 
increases and the uncertainty u decreases if the peer behaves as expected: 
prevprevprev udtt )200/1()200/1( ++=  
 
                                       
)200/199(*prevdd =          and 
 
                           
)200/199(*prevuu =
 
Periodically, the SOS server inspects the opinion DB. If a peer does not contributes in 
some time period (e.g. 10 minutes, etc), it may be suspected to be malicious or faulty 
peer. Therefore, the distrust d increases while the trust t and the uncertainty u decrease. 
We define the rule as following: 
prevprevprev utdd )50/1()50/1( ++=  
 
                                          )50/49(*prevtt =        and  
 
                                  
)50/49(*prevuu =  
Usually, the impact of negative experience is greater than the impact of positive 
experience. In our system model, we define that degrading rate based on negative 
experience is four times faster than increasing rate based on positive behaviour. 
5.2.5 A Typical Use Scenario 
We implement a typical use scenario to show that proposed approach provides better 
availability and security than traditional Chord-based system. Our implementation is 
based on previous implementation of Chord-based P2PSIP system with 512 peers in 
the space size 2048 (introduced in Chapter 3.8). We modify several functions (e.g. 
one-hop multicast, semi-recursive routing, etc) to realize the proposed system. We also 
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assume the system contains most of the normal P2PSIP peers (for example, 99%) and 
a few malicious / faulty peers.  
We also implement a Secure Opinion Server by using Java as the programming 
language, Apache Derby as the opinion database, and Apache tomcat as the 
background HTTP container.  
In this case, we initiate a P2PSIP request from peer 668, searching for the destination 
peer 1616. In the original Chord system, the message flow goes through peer 668 -> 
peer 939 -> peer 1030 -> peer 1110-> peer 1116. Then, we set the intermediate peer 
1110 as a malicious/fault intermediate peer that might discard, misroute or temper the 
data message. The testing of the original Chord-based system shows inability to locate 
the destination peer. However, this is different in the current approach. Because of the 
one-hop multicast function in the source peer, the destination peer might be able to 
receive multiple P2PSIP requests, as represented in Figure 5-14. Although the red one 
is misrouted/blocked by the malicious intermediate peer 1110, the other two routes 
(Black one and Green one) can still reach the destination.  
Then, we assume in a certain period, the opinions of related peers are:  
Table 5-1 Peer Opinion Table 
Peer ID Trust Distrust Uncertainty 
668 0.9 0.05 0.05 
784 0.8 0.1 0.1 
796 0.82 0.08 0.08 
1040 0.75 0.15 0.1 
1052 0.92 0.04 0.04 
1104 0.85 0.1 0.05 
1112 0.9 0.05 0.05 
1116 0.95 0.04 0.01 
We simulate this by manually modifying the opinion database. According to subjective 
logic rules specified before, the opinions about trustworthiness of two routes are: 
}592.0,016.0,392.0{Re =dpω  with v=0.656 
 
}328.0,027.0,645.0{=Blackpω  with v=0.755 
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After the opinion calculation, SOS returns the most trustful route (the black one) to the 
destination peer 1116 that allows choosing the most trustful route for session 
establishment. 
 
Figure  5-12: A Typical Use Scenario 
5.2.6 Summary 
Subjective logic based trust model provides secure services via selecting the most 
trustful message routes. The system resolves several issues including opinion 
calculation, opinion maintenance, message routing, and NAT traversal. Our approach 
improves the trustworthiness in the P2PSIP session establishment and protects the 
system from security breaches caused by misbehaviour of the malicious or faulty 
peers. 
However, some issues are still remaining. For example, source peer in this solution 
multicasts session layer “P2PSIP INVITE” messages into the overlay. This might 
increase load within overlay network. Besides, the malicious peer who receives 
multicasted messages is capable to collect sensitive privacy information. That creates 
new security concerns. Additionally, it might happen, in the worst case, multicast 
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messages from source peer are all intercepted by a few malicious peers. In this case, 
the request fails.   
5.3. COMBINING EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY 
Two security solutions proposed above have their limitations. Appropriate 
combination of these two solutions might provide solution that is both efficient and 
sufficiently secure. In this section, we study use case that combines both centralized 
proxy model and subjective logic trust model. Besides, we also combine two 
efficiency improvement approaches: cache mechanism and hierarchical layer division. 
According to previous study (in Chapter 3), cache mechanism is efficient in reducing 
chord lookup delay. Hierarchical layer division, according to theoretically analysis in 
[70], is capable to increase the overall capability of the overlay and reduce the system 
delay. On the other hand, computationally strong devices (with strong CPU power, big 
memory, and stable connection) have generally better protection (e.g. anti-virus 
software, firewall, etc) against security breaches than weak devices (for example, 
mobile phones in WiFi/3G connections). Therefore, the division of hierarchical 
suboverlay also provides, to some degree, security improvement for the top 
suboverlays.  
5.3.1 System Architecture 
We suggest divide the overlay into three sub-overlays according to peer capabilities, as 
shown in Figure 5-15. The first sub-overlay consists of stable peers that have public IP 
addresses, more powerful CPU, and stable connection. Such typical device can be a 
web server. Peers in the second sub-overlay are those who have enough stability and 
processing power, e.g. normal PC with Internet connection. Peers in this layer do not 
own public IP address, and might relay on STUN/TURN/ICE for NAT traversal. The 
lowest sub-overlay is those with unstable connection (e.g. mobile phones, PDA, 
laptops with wireless connection). Note that each sub-overlay contains a few CSPs for 
handling security services in intra-layer, and at least one CSPG (Chord Secure Proxy 
Gateway) for handling secure inter-layer communication. Both of CSP and CSPG are 
stable P2PSIP peers. 
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It is expected that many legacy P2PSIP peers are unstable peers (e.g. a large amount of 
mobile phones, PDA, laptops, etc) with wireless connections. Therefore, the division 
of three sub-overlay guarantees peer/resource lookup efficiency, and security 
protection in the top two layers.  
 
Figure  5-13: Three Layer Architecture 
5.3.2 “Ping” Multicast 
Subject logic trust calculation requires the record of message route. However, this is 
not available in centralized proxy based solution (using “Hello” message, specified in 
Chapter 5.1). Therefore, we suggest a session level “Ping” multicast mechanism, 
which contains “PingRequest” and “PingResponse”. “PingRequest” message consists 
of a “Via” header for recording the profile (e.g. peer ID, IP, port, etc) of each 
intermediate peer. An example is represented below: 
P2PSIP PingRequest 
Via: 586 158.36.228.48:9000; 612 128.39.189.61:8080  
Call-ID : 9849303 
CSP-ID: 512 
CSP-IP: 158.36.228.48 
CSP-Port: 9512 
Dest-ID:586 
When destination peer receives multiple “PingRequest” messages, it selects the most 
trusted route for handling (based on subjective logic trust calculation) and replies with 
a “PingResponse”. An example of Ping Response is: 
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P2PSIP PingResponse 
Call-ID: 9849303 
CSP-ID: 512 
CSP-IP: 158.36.228.48 
CSP-Port: 9512 
Dest-ID: 586 
Dest-IP: 69.0.128.30 
Dest-Port: 9001 
5.3.3 Use Cases 
Figure 5-16 illustrates inter-layer P2PSIP session initiation process between source 
peer A and destination peer B. Possible messages flows are: 
1) Source peer sends P2PSIP “INVITE” message to the CSPG in its sub-overlay. 
2) CSPG forwards “INVITE” to another CSPG in destination sub-overlay. 
3) The “INVITE” is forwarded to the CSP that is clockwise nearest to the 
destination peer.  
4) CSP multicasts a “PingRequest” to a few successors. Intermediate peers 
forward “PingRequest” step by step until the destination. 
5) Destination peer receives several identical “PingRequest”. It asks SOS server 
via sending all possible routes. After trust calculation, SOS replies with a best 
route.    
6) Destination peer returns a “PingResponse” to CSP. 
7) CSP forwards original P2PSIP “INVITE” message to destination peer. 
8) Destination peer returns a P2PSIP “180 Ringing” to source peer.  
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Figure  5-14: Inter-Layer Session Initiation 
5.3.4 Efficiency Study 
We first analyze the lookup algorithm without the consideration of cache mechanism. 
We assume that the number of peers and CSPs in the overlay is N
 
and S
 
respectively, 
where 
1N , 2N , 3N  are the number of peers in each sub-overlay from top to bottom and 1S , 
2S , 3S  are number of CSPs in each sub-overlay from top to bottom. Besides, we 
assume that source peer communicates with the other peers in each sub-overlay (layer 
1, layer 2, and layer 3) with a probability of 1p , 2p , 3p . Also, we assume that peers and 
CSPs are evenly distributed in the overlay space.
 
 
Based on Chord routing protocol [109], the average num-of-hop of “PingRequest” 
multicast is )/log(21 ii SN , where i  denotes a corresponding sub-overlay. Therefore, the 
number of hops of intra-suboverlay is 1)/log(21 +ii SN  due to the addition of one CSP; 
the complexity of inter-suboverlay is 3)/log(21 +ii SN  due to addition of two CSPGs and 
one CSP (see Steps 1-3 in Figure 5-16). 
According to the mean rule [103], the average number of hops is: 
3
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After that, we assume that 8.0321 === ppp , based on the concept that most 
communication sessions are geographically related to each other (according to Section 
3.3). Therefore, the average num-of-hops is: 
 
 
Figure 5-17 shows the improved result (we set S=16 and S=32 separately) comparing 
with conventional Chord-based system. We come to the conclusion that our proposed 
lookup mechanism is more efficient than a conventional Chord lookup approach. 
Besides, with increasing S, the better lookup efficiency will be also provided.  
 
Figure  5-15: Num-of-Hops Comparison 
In order to evaluate the impact of cache mechanism, we measure the system delay. We 
choose one peer (we use peer 586 in this example) as the source peer, and randomly 
select 100 peers (which are divided into 10 groups, each of which contains 10 peers) in 
each suboverlay as the destination peer. We initiate P2PSIP request from source peer 
and measure the latency between request and response. After that, we calculate the 
average delay in each group (shown in Figure 5-18). 
In the beginning, the delays in three sublayers are more or less similar (between 250-
300ms). However, the latencies in layer 1 (green one) and layer 2 (red one) are greatly 
reduced with the increasing of the number of groups. We believe this is the 
contribution of cache mechanism.  
)(log
2
14.1 2 S
N
+
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Figure  5-16: Delays Testing 
5.3.5 Security Assessment 
Table 5-1 gives the security comparison among three solutions introduced in this 
chapter.  
Table  5-2 Three Solutions Security Comparison 
 CSP-based solution Subjective logic based trust 
enhancement 
Combination solution + 
hierarchical division 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
 
Low, ”PingRequest” is 
sent one way out by Chord 
routing algorithm. 
Malicious peers in this 
route could drop, modify, 
or misdirect messages.   
High, “P2PSIP INVITE” 
multicast creates several 
route options. 
High, “PingRequest” 
multicast creates several 
route options. 
Co
n
fid
en
tia
lit
y  
Certificate based 
encryption and decryption. 
 
Certificate based encryption 
and decryption. 
 
Certificate based encryption 
and decryption. 
D
at
a 
In
te
gr
ity
 
 
Certificate based digital 
signature.  
 
Certificate based digital 
signature. 
 
Certificate based digital 
signature. 
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A
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n
 
CSP is able to provide 
authentication. 
No trusted entities in 
overlay, no authentication. 
CSP and CSPG authenticate 
request and response.  
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Strong guarantee.  
CSP protects privacy of 
source peer. 
Weak because request is 
multicasted. Any 
intermediate malicious peer 
who receives the request 
can understand sensitive 
privacy. 
Strong guarantee.  
CSP and CSPG protect 
privacy of source peer. 
R
o
u
te
 
tr
u
st
w
o
rt
hi
n
es
s 
Not trusted. Because 
“PingRequest”can be 
modified by malicious 
intermediate peer in the 
middle. 
Good. SOS server selects 
best route according to 
opinion calculation.  
Good. SOS server selects 
best route according to 
opinion calculation. 
Se
cu
rit
y 
v
u
ln
er
ab
ili
tie
s 
Low availability. Privacy problem. Peers in lowest sublayer still 
face security problems. 
Mostly because of their own 
security vulnerability (e.g. 
no protection, dangerous 
under the virus, etc).   
Security is mainly based on previous proposals, including CSP based security, 
subjective logic based trust enhancement, PKI certificate based security, etc. Besides, 
three-layer hierarchical division also guarantees, to some degree, security in the first 
two sublayers through classifying unstable peers (usually also security vulnerable 
peers) belonging to the  lowest sublayer. We believe the proposed solution combines 
the advantages of several solutions and provides improved overall security.   
However, from one side hierarchical division improves overall system security; from 
other side it moves security issues to the lowest sublayer. Therefore, the question how 
to enhance security in that vulnerable sublayer of the overlay should be considered in 
the future.  
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Chapter 6. Secure Interconnecting with P2PSIP 
and IMS 
 
P2PSIP should provide means for interconnecting different 
networks. This chapter introduces an approach for interworking 
between P2PSIP system and future IP Multimedia Subsystem 
(IMS) based system.  
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, researchers are beginning to study the possibility of interconnecting 
between P2PSIP and IMS networks. One typical proposal is described in [56], which 
implements a Gateway Application Server (AS) that is a peer on P2PSIP side and an 
Application Server on IMS side (Figure 6-1). Through the bridge function of Gateway 
AS, the users in different networks are capable to communicate with each other. The 
system model looks feasible from networking point of view.  
 
Figure  6-1: Interconnection Model 
However, the proposed interconnection model faces serious security problems. Firstly, 
security of the messages traversing inside P2PSIP overlay is not guaranteed due to the 
nature of P2P (distrust among participating peers, etc). Let us consider a typical 
malicious model (represented in Figure 4-2), which also specifies interaction between 
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Gateway AS and P2PSIP UA. Peer B (the panda) that acts as a malicious intermediate 
peer in P2PSIP overlay is capable to misroute, discard, temper, and replay the received 
P2PSIP messages.  
Secondly, Gateway AS is public to all malicious participating peers in the overlay, 
which makes a few malicious behaviours possible. For example, a malicious peer is 
capable to initiate SPAM attack to IMS network through sending a multitude of 
P2PSIP requests to Gateway AS. This may cause unnecessary trouble (e.g. ring call, 
instance message, etc) in IMS users. Besides, the malicious peer (who receives P2PSIP 
message) could spy and record the profiles of previous intermediate peers (e.g. peer ID, 
public IP, Port, etc.) through parsing incoming messages. This sensitive information 
could be used to initiate DoS and SPAM attacks on a peer or the PIGW. 
Therefore, in order to provide full interconnecting solutions, security issues should be 
taken into consideration, especially security issues within P2PSIP network. Before we 
propose possible solutions, we assume two requirements for interworking between 
P2PSIP and IMS that must be satisfied: 
• Networking availability: At least one trusted gateway for relaying messages 
between P2PSIP and IMS domains must be available. 
• Security Guarantee: The secure message routing in P2PSIP domain should be 
guaranteed. Besides, the gateway should be resilient on a series of attacks, e.g. 
DoS attack, SPAM, etc. 
In this chapter, we investigate on P2PSIP and IMS systems and propose P2PSIP-IMS 
GateWay (PIGW) as a secure interworking gateway between P2PSIP and IMS 
domains. Security is achieved by combination of Chord Secure Proxy (CSP), PKI-
based certificate and subjective logic based trust approaches (as described in Chapter 
5).  
6.2. INTERWORKING ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 6-2 shows the proposed system architecture, which contains following five 
elements:  
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• P2PSIP-IMS Interworking Gateway (PIGW) is the key interworking unit for 
translation of messages between P2PSIP and IMS networks. 
• P2PSIP peer, which can be a PC, laptop, PDA, mobile phones etc., is connected 
into the Internet. Each P2PSIP peer has a corresponding CSP as its master node. 
• Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) is the secure proxy that relays the messages among 
PIGW and P2PSIP peers. The main task of CSP is to protect sensitive 
information (e.g. peer ID, public IP, port, etc) from understanding to most of 
P2PSIP peers but itself.   
• Enrolment & Authentication (E&A) Server handles enrolment and 
authentication task when P2PSIP peers join P2PSIP overlay.    
• Secure Opinion Server (SOS) is the security enhancement server that handles 
dynamic opinion computing and storage task for each P2PSIP peer. 
 
Figure  6-2: Secure System Architecture 
HSS (Home Subscriber Server) is the IMS core element which provides identity 
authentication and management for IMS clients, including PIGW; CSCF is the IMS 
core element that relays messages between PIGW and IMS clients. CSPs and PIGW 
are pre-deployed backbone nodes in P2PSIP network. They are assumed to be trusted 
in P2PSIP network. In the following sections, we will specify technical approaches 
including networking and security.  
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6.3. P2PSIP-IMS GATEWAY (PIGW) 
P2PSIP-IMS Gateway is the key inter-working unit, acting as bridge between P2PSIP 
and IMS networks. PIGW acts as a normal P2PSIP peer on P2PSIP side and as an IMS 
application server on IMS side. There are five components inside PIGW (see Figure 6-
3): 
• P2PSIP Peer. This subcomponent acts as a normal peer that receives/sends 
P2PSIP message from/to P2PSIP network. 
• Translation Logic component. This component handles translation between 
P2PSIP and IMS messages.   
• Forwarding Logic component. This component decides where and how to 
forward P2PSIP messages. It defines message routing strategy. For example, it 
defines the rule: P2PSIP message is forwarded to a specific CSP that is anti-
clockwise nearest to the destination peer. Inside this subcomponent, there is a 
database recording all the connections to CSPs (e.g. CSP ID, public IP, port, 
etc) in P2PSIP overlay. 
• IMS UA. IMS UA handles IMS client functionality that sends/receives IMS 
messages to/from IMS core. It contains an UICC smart card for IMS 
authentication. 
• IMS Application Server. This part receives IMS request from IMS client and 
sends the corresponding response to IMS core.   
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Figure  6-3: P2PSIP-IMS Gateway Internal 
When IMS Application Server component receives IMS request, the translation logic 
component parses the messages, retrieve destination peer identity and generate 
corresponding P2PSIP message. After that, P2PSIP UA sends out P2PSIP request to a 
specific CSP according to the direction of the Forwarding logic component. 
When receiving P2PSIP request, translation logic component parses P2PSIP messages, 
retrieves IMS related information (e.g. destination IMS ID, etc), generates IMS 
messages, and forwards to IMS UA component, which sends out IMS request.  
With respect to security, we suggest that PIGW is only capable to communicate with 
CSPs. Since CSP is assumed to be trusted, sensitive privacy (e.g. PIGW peer ID, 
public IP, port, etc) is revealed to most of P2PSIP peers. Therefore, it is difficult for 
malicious peer to initiate a few attacks, such as DoS attack and SPAM to PIGW.   
6.4. SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
IMS core is assumed to be secure due to its own mature security framework (e.g. IPsec 
based security, HSS based authentication and authorization, etc).  
PIGW is assumed to be a trusted entity. Therefore, it is capable to protect privacy of 
IMS client and P2PSIP peer from leaking confidential data. For protecting data 
confidentiality and integrity, all connections must be encrypted.  
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P2PSIP overlay security is enhanced as described in Chapters 5, including CSP based 
security, subjective logic based trust enhancement, PKI certificate based security, 
E&A server, etc.  
6.5. ERROR HANDLING 
The initiated request might not be able to reach the target due to a few reasons. For 
example, IMS client or P2PSIP peer might loss the connection with network due to the 
limitation of device capability (e.g. no power, system deadlock, etc) or network 
problem (e.g. no signal, etc). Therefore, it is necessary to notify the source when the 
target is unreachable. We propose that PIGW handles notification task by sending 
“P2PSIP MESSAGE” and “SIP MESSAGE”. One typical example will be shown in 
the following section. 
6.6. USE CASE SCENARIOS 
In the following subsections we demonstrate the using of the proposed architecture for 
text based instant messing services, with three use cases. We define “P2PSIP 
MESSAGE” and “SIP MESSAGE” as the requests, “P2PSIP 200 OK” and “SIP 200 
OK” as corresponding responses. Note that the proposed system architecture can be 
extendable with other advanced services (e.g. presence services, VoIP, etc). 
Use Case 1 (see Figure 6-4) describes how IMS client sends message to a P2PSIP 
peer. Possible message exchange among IMS client, PIGW, CSP, intermediate peers, 
and destination peer is shown in the following description: 
1. IMS client sends “SIP MESSAGE” message to PIGW (for example, 260 as P2PSIP 
ID and pigw@ericsson.com as IMS ID). 
2. PIGW returns “SIP 200 OK” to IMS client. 
3. PIGW sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” message to the specific CSP that is responsible 
for destination peer.  
4. CSP multicasts “PingRequest”, which is then forwarded by intermediate peers to 
the destination. 
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5. Destination peer receives several “PingRequest” from different routes. It asks SOS 
server to select one of them. 
6. SOS server returns the most trustful route. 
7. Destination peer returns a “PingResponse” to corresponding CSP. 
8. CSP forwards original “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to destination peer. 
9. Destination peer returns a “P2PSIP 200 OK” the corresponding CSP.  
10. CSP forwards original “P2PSIP 200 OK” back to PIGW. 
 
Figure  6-4: IMS Client sends message to P2PSIP Peer 
Figure 6-5 describes how P2PSIP peer sends message to IMS client. Possible message 
exchange among P2PSIP peer, CSP, PIGW, and IMS client is shown in the following 
description: 
1. P2PSIP peer sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to a responsible CSP.  
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2. CSP forwards “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to PIGW (for example, 260 as P2PSIP ID and 
pigw@ericsson.com as IMS ID).  
3. PIGW returns “SIP 200 OK” to the corresponding CSP.  
4. Corresponding CSP returns “P2PSIP 200 OK” back to P2PSIP peer.  
5. PIGW sends “SIP MESSAGE” to IMS client. 
6. IMS client returns “SIP 200 OK” to PIGW. 
 
Figure  6-5: P2PSIP Peer sends message to IMS Client 
Figure 6-6 shows the error handling use scenario when P2PSIP peer is unreachable. 
Possible message exchange among source peer, CSP, intermediate peers and 
destination peer is shown in the following description: 
1. P2PSIP peer sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to its corresponding CSP.  
2. Corresponding CSP forwards “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to PIGW (for example, 260 as 
P2PSIP ID and pigw@ericsson.com as IMS ID).  
3. PIGW sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to P2PSIP network.  
4. Message retransmission after a certain time (Time to Live (TTL) is defined). 
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5. PIGW replies to IMS client with “UNREACHABLE PEER” message. 
6. IMS client returns “SIP 200 OK” to PIGW. 
 
Figure  6-6: Handling Unreachable P2PSIP Peer 
6.7. SIMULATION 
We simulate a P2PSIP overlay of 512 P2PSIP peers, with 496 P2PSIP normal peers, 
15 CSPs and a PIGW peer. After that, we import IMS application server function to 
PIGW, which then acts as an IMS application server (with ims id: 
greetings@ericsson.com) and a P2PSIP peer (with id: 260). Apache Derby is selected 
as the embedded database implementation for P2PSIP peers, CSPs, and PIGW.  
Ericsson SDS 4.1 (Service Development Studio) is used as development tool for 
simulating IMS environment. It contains a network simulator (developed from Sun 
GlassFish communication server) for simulating IMS core network and testing agents 
for simulating IMS clients [10, 11]. Figure 6-7 shows a typical IMS client testing 
agent, which is capable to create, send, and receive IMS messages. It also provides 
client configuration, for instance, defining listening port, choosing TCP or UDP 
transport protocol, and saving the debug file.  
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We implement text based instant messaging service to show availability of proposed 
system with two use scenarios: IMS client sends message to P2PSIP peer and P2PSIP 
peer sends message to IMS client. We manually define “P2PSIP MESSAGE” as 
request and “P2PSIP 200 OK” as response, as shown respectively in the following: 
MESSAGE alice@ericsson.com P2PSIP/2.0 
Max-Forwards: 70 
CSeq: MESSAGE 
Content-Length: 20 
Contact: 586 
From 586 
To: alice@ericsson.com 
Call-ID: 517846 
Via: 586 158.36.228.48:9586; 512 158.36.228.48:9512 
 
How are you? 
 
 
P2PSIP/2.0 200 OK 
To: alice@ericsson.com 
From: 586 
Contact: 586 
CSeq: 200 OK 
Content-Length: 0 
From 586 
Via: 586 158.36.228.48:9586; 512 158.36.228.48:9512 
 
The system is deployed separately on a platform with Windows XP professional 
system, 2*2.4G Intel Core CPU and 3G memory. Wireshark [29] is used to monitor 
the message transmission. The testing shows that the system works well.    
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Figure  6-7: Ericsson IMS Test Agent 
6.8. EVALUATION 
Number-of-Hops and Delay Measurement 
We assume that N
 
is the number of P2PSIP peers in the overlay, including S  CSPs. 
We first consider the number of hops in Use Scenario 1 (Figure 6-4 in Section 6.7). 
According to Chord routing algorithm, the average number of hops of “PingRequest” 
is )/(log2 SN . In addition to 3 hops among IMS clients, PIGW, CSP and SOS server, 
the average number of hops in Use Scenario 1 is )/(log3 2 SN+ . As to Use Scenario 2 
(described in Figure 6-5 in Section 6.7), the number of hops is equal to 3. 
Then we measure delays of two use scenarios (in Section 6.7). We first select an IMS 
client (with ims id: alice@ericsson.com) as the initiator and randomly select 20 
P2PSIP peers as destinations. We send the request and measure the latency between 
“SIP MESSAGE” sent out from IMS client and “P2PSIP 200 OK” received in 
PIGW260.  We get the average delay equal to 326ms. Using similar method, we get 
the delay for Use Scenario 2 as 408ms. According to the simulation result of num-of-
hops and delays, we believe that the proposed interconnecting system architecture is 
feasible.  
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Security Assessment 
The proposed system is capable to provide secure services. Let us look at two use 
scenarios represented in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5.  
When IMS client initiates the session (Figure 6-4), requested message travels through 
PIGW, CSP and a few intermediate peers. Since PIGW and CSP are trusted entities, 
that means, security breaches mainly exist in “PingRequest” multicast process. For 
example, the “PingRequest” multicast may be modified, dropped, or replayed by 
malicious intermediate peers. With the implementation of subjective logic based trust 
enhancement, we reduce security vulnerability of this part of the system. 
P2PSIP request, initiated by a peer (Figure 6-5), needs to travel through two 
intermediate peers before reaching IMS client (peer->CSP->PIGW->IMS client). 
Since CSP and PIGW are trusted entities, the session process is trusted. 
However, similar with previous proposal (in Section 5.3), it might happen that, in the 
worst case, all “PingRequest” multicast messages are intercepted by a few malicious 
peers. In this case the request will fail. 
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Chapter 7. Secure Architecture for “P2PSIP 
Client” 
 
In this chapter, we propose a thin client based approach to 
improve security of P2PSIP systems. We introduce a special type 
of entity, called “P2PSIP Client” and propose a solution based 
on Thin Client P2PSIP Gateway (TC-PPSG), which acts as a 
normal peer in P2PSIP network, and a HTTP application server 
in Internet. The main issues considered here are: security, 
identity mapping, “push” technology, etc.  
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter, we study a special type of entity, called “P2PSIP client”, which is now 
discussed in IETF P2PSIP Working Group [18]. P2PSIP client is the node who 
participates in overlay but does not provide distributed transport and storage functions. 
In order to access services, a possible “client protocol” is defined in Internet-drafts 
proposed in [105, 118]. Figure 7-1 illustrates the basic concept. The client protocol 
provides a mechanism for exchanging information between client and a normal peer. 
The normal peer (for instance, peer 20 in Figure 7-1) acts as “association peer”, 
helping client (the triangle) to access P2PSIP services. On one hand, it stores client 
related information so that peers in the overlay is able to locate the client; and on the 
other hand, it handles client request for transport service functions (for example, send 
P2PSIP request).   
Client protocol is IP layer based request-response protocol, which defines how client 
finds and interacts with its associated peer; how client creates, maintains, and 
Secure Architecture for “P2PSIP Client”   
 96 
terminates session with a normal peer. Client protocol is supposed to support a 
function subset included in peer protocol. 
 
Figure  7-1: Client Protocol Approach 
However, client protocol has a few disadvantages. Firstly, it does not consider at all 
security and privacy issues. On one side, associated peer has to serve client based on 
its requests, no matter whether client is malicious or not; on the other side client is 
uncertain about the trustworthiness of its associated peer. Since peer and client distrust 
each other, subsequent data transmissions may result in violation of data 
confidentiality, integrity and privacy. 
Secondly, client protocol does not propose appropriate roaming mechanism. Roaming 
might happen when client notices a better hosting service. For example, a moving 
portable device may find a new associated candidate peer with faster IP connection. 
On the other hand, the overloaded associated peer might suggest its clients turn to a 
better option.    
Thirdly, the proposed client protocol lacks convincing prototype implementations that 
validate the concept.  
In this chapter, we study an alternative solution, which is based on thin client model. 
Besides, some approaches proposed in Chapter 5 can be reused in system architecture 
for security enhancement. These approaches include CSP based security, subjective 
logic based trust enhancement, Enrolment and Authentication server, PKI-certificate 
security, etc. 
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7.2. THIN CLIENT COMPUTING 
Thin Client computing offers the promise of easier-to-maintain computational services 
with reduced total cost of ownership [125]. In this mode of computing, most of the 
functionality is located on the server side, while the client device only performs very 
simple display and query functions. One typical example of this mode of computing is 
using browsers to explore and access services. With the help of web browsers, it is 
possible to communicate with the Application Server somewhere in the network. 
Thin client mode computing greatly reduces development cost, easier operation effort 
because most of operations are performed on server side. Besides, the system 
architecture provide better security (e.g. protect against theft, damage, malware, 
spyware, and viruses, etc) due to the fact that application related data are stored in 
central server instead of thin client.       
Portable devices today are equipped with various kinds of browsers. So, these devices 
could become “thin clients” using thin client computing mode. In the following 
sections, we study web-browser-based thin client computing mode to access P2PSIP 
services. The web interface is provided through a slim web browser. The thin client 
supported functionality should be able to translate the P2PSIP signaling into HTTP 
messages and present relevant content as HTML-pages.  
7.3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In this section, the proposed thin client based architecture is described. After that, we 
specify related solutions, including TC-PPSG internal, security, identity mapping, 
“push” technology, etc.  
7.3.1 Architecture Overview 
The proposed architecture involves three main parts: P2PSIP client, Thin Client 
P2PSIP Gateway (TC-PPSG), and P2PSIP overlay (including peers, CSP peers, E&A 
servers, SOS servers, described in Chapter 5), as shown in Figure 7-2.  
P2PSIP client, which can be a mobile phone, laptop, PC, etc., is connected to the 
Internet. It contains a web browser for accessing Internet. TC-PPSG is the 
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interconnecting gateway that is an application server in Internet and a normal P2PSIP 
peer in P2PSIP network. P2PSIP overlay is assumed to be secure overlay that includes 
security enhancement approaches described in Chapter 5.  
For locating a peer/resource in P2PSIP overlay, client sends a HTTP request to the 
TC-PPSG. TC-PPSG parses HTTP message, catches useful information (e.g. source, 
destination, public IP, etc), generates P2PSIP message, and forwards request to the 
overlay. The overlay is responsible to locate the destination peer. Finally, the session 
between client and normal peer can be established.  
The reversal session to locate a P2PSIP client is similar.  
 
Figure  7-2: Thin Client P2PSIP Architecture 
7.3.2 TC-PPSG Internal 
Thin Client P2PSIP Gateway (TC-PPSG) is the key inter-working unit, acting as a 
bridge between client and peer. Note that TC-PPSG is deployed as P2PSIP application 
server with the functionality of a normal P2PSIP peer, and as an Internet application 
server. There are four main components inside a TC-PPSG unit (see Figure 7-3): 
• Thin Client inter-working component. This part consists of a servlet container 
for receiving HTTP request and replying corresponding response. It 
communicates with ID Management component for authenticating user ID. It 
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forwards HTTP messages to P2PSIP interworking component. It also 
communicates with O&M Provisioning component for manual configuration 
and provisioning.   
• P2PSIP Interworking. This part contains a translation logic component that 
handles the translation task between P2PSIP and HTTP messages; a forwarding 
logic that sends message out to P2PSIP network properly or forwards to Thin 
Client Interworking component.  
• ID Management. This component manages client identity. It contains an ID 
database that stores user identifiers, passwords and P2PSIP identities. It assists 
the other three components with ID authentication and configuration. 
• O&M Provisioning. System administrator, for maintenance, manual 
configuration and provisioning, operates this component. 
 
Figure  7-3: TC-PPSG Structure 
7.3.3 Security and Privacy 
All connections must be encrypted for providing data confidentiality and integrity.  
Since TC-PPSG is assumed to be a trusted entity and the only contact point for clients, 
it is capable to protect confidentiality of client data (e.g. client ID, password, IP, etc) 
from leaking.  
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P2PSIP overlay security is provided by solutions described in Chapter 5 or referred to 
in the publications  [121, 119, 122, 124]. 
7.3.4 Identity Mapping 
Interconnecting P2PSIP with Internet requires the mapping function between user 
Internet identity and its P2PSIP identity. There are two options for handling user 
identities, “Connecting gateway” in which only TC-PPSG is connected into the 
overlay and “Connecting client and gateway” in which both TC-PPSG and P2PSIP 
client are connected into the overlay. Principally, we support both of the options.  
In the first option, TC-PPSG is registered into P2PSIP overlay while client is hidden. 
The mapping model is as illustrated in Figure 7-4. P2PSIP Client “borrows” the 
identity of TC-PPSG (with overlay ID 260) to send and receive P2PSIP messages. For 
example, Internet-oriented user identities (e.g. Alice, Bob, and Coco, etc) are mapped 
to TC-PPSG identity (ID 260). This approach would cause no problem when the 
session is initiated from P2PSIP client, however, the reverse session (when P2PSIP 
peer want to talk with P2PSIP client) might require additional functionality to 
distinguish corresponding P2PSIP client. A possible option is to define a P2PSIP 
extension header to carry client information. The extension header starts with a header 
field “Client”, and value field recording user identity. An example is represented in 
Section 7.5. 
 
Figure  7-4: Identity Mapping Approach 
The second approach maps client identity to a specific P2PSIP identifier. In this 
approach, TC-PPSG applies specific P2PSIP identity for each client (for instance, 
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apply to E&A server, etc). Client identity is defined to be the next hop successor of 
TC-PPSG. For instance (See Figure 7-5), TC-PPSG applies three IDs (261, 263, 270), 
which are logically its own direct successors in the overlay. According to Chord 
overlay algorithm, all data traffic going to these IDs have to travel through TC-PPSG. 
Therefore, as the only contact point, TC-PPSG is capable to relay the connections for 
its clients.  
 
Figure  7-5: Identity Mapping Alternative 
7.3.5 “Push” Technology 
One important technical issue is that thin client browser should be able to receive 
updated information automatically so that from end user point of view, the message is 
“pushed” into browser. One simple solution is HTML auto-refresh mechanism [30]. 
Each time client needs the data, it requests server expressly to reload the whole web 
page. The interaction between client and server is shown in Figure 7-6. 
Auto-refresh functionality can be achieved by either setting “META” attribute of 
HTML (for example, “<meta http-equiv=”refresh” content = 30>” means refreshing 
the page each 30 seconds) or calling embedded page script function, both of which 
have been widely implemented in traditional web applications.  
Although this kind of mechanism requires higher bandwidth and wastes unnecessary 
data traffic, it is suitable for most of the Fixed / Mobile browsers currently exist.  
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Figure  7-6: Web Auto-Refresh Mechanism 
Another more sophisticated solution is based on AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and 
XML) [50], which interweaves technologies including JavaScript, Document Object 
Model (DOM), Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), and Dynamic HTML (DHTML). In this 
mechanism, client browser uses JavaScript to periodically interact with the server by 
reloading dynamic “tag” elements. Updated element and value are encapsulated in 
XML document and transferred back by HTTP protocol. The interaction process is 
shown in Figure 7-7. Compared with web refresh mechanism, this approach greatly 
reduces network traffic; however, only a few advanced browsers (e.g. Opera Mobile 
[17], IE mobile [12], etc) currently support AJAX.  
 
Figure  7-7: AJAX mechanism 
In Thin Client P2PSIP Architecture, we propose to use both of above technologies. 
The first approach is supported by most of resource-limited clients. The second 
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approach can be implemented in advanced browsers that support AJAX technology. 
During the connection establishment, TC-PPSG should be able to detect client 
device/browser type, capability and then intelligently choose different “Push” 
technologies.   
7.4. USE SCENARIOS 
In this section, we describe the detail of use scenarios that are supported by the 
proposed thin client based P2PSIP architecture. We define “P2PSIP MESSAGE” as 
the request and “P2PSIP 200 OK” as the response.  
7.4.1 Client Registration 
Use case 1 (see Figure 7-8) describes P2PSIP client registration process to TC-PPSG. 
Note that we only present “Connecting gateway” option. Possible messages flows are: 
1) Source peer sends “HTTP Registration” request to TC-PPSG. The request should 
include at least user name and password.  
2) TC-PPSG validates user name and password.  For instance, it checks if user name 
is unique or not, and if password is not too simple. If everything is OK, it returns a 
“200 OK” response. Otherwise, it will return an error message. 
 
Figure  7-8: Client Registration 
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7.4.2 Instant Messaging  
Use case 2 (see Figure 7-9) describes how P2PSIP client and peer contact each other 
by sending instant message. Note P2PSIP client has been registered to TC-PPSG. 
Possible messages flows are: 
1) Source peer sends “HTTP message” to TC-PPSG. The instant message is 
encapsulated inside HTTP body.   
2) TC-PPSG translates HTTP request to “P2PSIP MESSAGE”, which is then 
forwarded to the overlay. Finally, it reaches destination peer.   
3) Destination peer replies with “P2PSIP 200 OK”. 
4) TC-PPSG replies a “HTTP 200 OK” to client browser. 
5) Destination peer, who wants to talk with client, initiates a “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to 
TC-PPSG. 
6) TC-PPSG replies with “P2PSIP 200 OK”. 
7) Instant message is pushed to client browser.  
 
Figure  7-9: Instant Messing Use Scenario 
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7.4.3 Voice over IP 
Use case 3 (see Figure 7-10) describes how P2PSIP client initiates VoIP session with a 
P2PSIP peer. Note client browser has been equipped with advanced technologies (e.g. 
flash support, etc) that support VoIP. Besides, client has been registered to TC-PPSG. 
Possible messages flows are: 
1) Source peer sends “HTTP invite” request to TC-PPSG. Session related information 
(opening port, codec, etc) is included in HTTP body.  
2) TC-PPSG translates HTTP request to “P2PSIP INVITE”, and then forwards it to 
the overlay. Finally, the request reaches destination peer.   
3) Destination peer replies with “P2PSIP 200 OK”. 
4) “P2PSIP 200 OK” is translated to “HTTP 200 OK”, which is forwarded to client 
browser. 
5) Session negotiation and establishment.  
 
Figure  7-10: VoIP Use Scenario 
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7.5. IMPLEMENTATION 
Our previous P2PSIP implementation (the overlay contains 512 P2PSIP peers, 
including with 16 CSP peers, and 496 normal peers) [120, 122] is extended to model 
thin client architecture. We extend the functionality of an existing peer to be TC-
PPSG, which is deployed as a HTTP application server in Internet, and a P2PSIP peer 
in P2PSIP network. Apache Derby is used to simulate embedded database inside TC-
PPSG.  
We build a text based instant message use scenario. A P2PSIP “MESSAGE” is defined 
as request message (an example is presented below). The “MESSAGE” starts with a 
few request header fields useful for initiating session, such as client id, source, 
destination, and routed intermediate parties; and follows by the main message body.  
 MESSAGE 260 P2PSIP/2.0 
 Client: alice 
 Max-Forwards: 70 
 CSeq: MESSAGE 
 Content-length: 70 
 Contact: 586 
 From: 586 
 To: 260 
 Call-ID: 4857294 
 Via: 512 192.168.0.99:9512; 
 
Hello Alice, How are you? 
 
After that, a corresponding “200 OK” is defined as success response, as below:  
P2PSIP/2.0 200 OK 
To: 586 
From: 260 
Contact: 586 
CSeq: 200 OK  
Content-Length: 0 
Via: 260 127.0.0.1:9260 
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We use Openwave simulator V7 [16], Opera mini browser [17], and IE 8.0 browser 
[12]  to test the system. The browsers are capable to initiate a “MESSAGE” request 
and reach a P2PSIP peer. However, the transmission of an instant message from a peer 
to a client would take at most 30 seconds before it will be displayed in the browser due 
to the refresh time interval. Generally, the functionality works well although the 
displayed HTML UI is not user friendly due to small size of mobile screens.  
7.6. EVALUATIONS 
Table 7-1 presents the comparison of our proposed thin client solution with current 
proposal “client protocol”.  
Table  7-1 Two Solutions Comparison 
 Client protocol solution Thin Client System architecture 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
No guarantee because associated 
peer and client are not trusted 
each other. Malicious associated 
peer is capable to discard, replay, 
and modify client request.   
Guaranteed because TC-PPSG is 
the trusted entity.  
 
 
U
se
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
su
pp
o
rt
ed
 
All use scenarios as P2PSIP peer, 
such as Instant Messing, 
Presence services, VoIP, etc. 
Supports most of use scenarios. 
Depends on browser 
capabilities. For example, need 
flash supported browser to 
support VoIP.   
A
u
th
en
tic
at
io
n
 Currently no. Associated peer 
has to serve for client. 
Client Internet ID. Only 
registered client can use 
services. 
In
te
gr
ity
 Certificate supports digital 
signature. 
Certificate supports digital 
signature. 
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D
at
a 
co
n
fid
en
tia
lit
y Certificate based encryption and 
decryption. 
Certificate based encryption and 
decryption. 
Pr
iv
ac
y 
No guaranteed. Malicious 
associated peer can intercept the 
connection and spy sensitive 
privacy 
TC-PPSG is trust entity that 
protects sensitive privacy for all 
clients.  
 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
 Very difficult to implement. 
Need two version applications, 
one for associated peer and one 
for client. 
Implementation only in TC-
PPSG.  
 
En
d 
de
v
ic
es
 
su
pp
o
rt
 
Targeted at most devices that 
support basic TCP/UDP 
protocols. Still need some CPU 
processing power, bandwidth, to 
support the applications. Client 
has to install the application 
before using it.  
Supported by most devices that 
equip with browser.  
No need to download 
application, however, needs to 
register first.  
M
o
bi
lit
y Not defined yet. This makes 
roaming difficult to achieve.  
No problem because of none 
associated peer is included.  
D
eb
u
g 
an
d 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
Difficult. Debug needs to 
consider both associated peer and 
client side. If the vulnerability is 
found, all the peers and clients 
need update their applications 
Easy to debug and maintenance. 
All the functions are in TC-
PPSG entity. 
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The comparison shows client protocol solution is better in supporting P2PSIP use 
scenarios. However, thin client based system architecture is superior in other aspects. 
Due to lack of credential entities, client and associated peer distrust each other all the 
time, and this creates security, privacy and reliability problems. Currently, there is no 
efficient mechanism proposed in “client” solution. In contrast, our proposed thin client 
solution offers guarantee on system reliability and privacy protection because TC-
PPSG is regarded as trusted entity. Also, our previously described approaches (e.g. 
CSP based security, subjective logic based trust enhancement, etc) are also used to 
enhance security in P2PSIP overlay.       
Besides, the concept of client protocol has difficulty in implementation, debugging and 
later maintenance because all functionalities require simultaneous changes on both 
associated peers and client sides. Even worse, because the client protocol is not 
mature, there is no convinced prototype to support the proposals. In contrast, our 
solution inherits the advantage of thin client computing on fast development and easy 
maintenance since all functions are done only on TC-PPSG side.  
Furthermore, our approach is independent of device location and therefore provides 
better roaming capability (as long as the Internet connection is available) than client 
protocol based approach.  
In summary, we believe that our proposed solution, currently, is better than “client 
protocol” based proposal, after consideration and comparison of technical aspects.   
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Future works 
 
This Chapter concludes thesis work. It starts with retrospect of 
P2P research, followed by description of our research work. 
Finally, open issues and possible solutions are also presented.  
 
8.1. CONCLUSIONS 
P2PSIP is a promising future trend. It is supposed to be a communication protocol that 
supports a set of real-time multimedia services, such as presence, instant messaging, 
Voice over IP (VoIP), etc. Unfortunately, P2PSIP is far from mature and still needs 
time for solving critical technical challenges. In the thesis, we mainly answer four 
critical questions.  
Firstly, we propose and analyse a few approaches to reduce delays during session 
initiation, and therefore improve system efficiency. The improvement includes 
revision of lookup algorithm, geographical association, cache mechanism, hierarchical 
architecture, optimized routing, etc. The following mathematical analysis proves 
performance improvement of proposed approaches. According to testing results, we 
conclude that cache mechanism is probably one of best improvement options. 
Secondly, we consider security issues and propose new solutions to enhance the 
system security. Solutions include centralized proxy based approach, and subjective 
logic based trust enhancement. Both solutions contain centralized proxy/server 
elements for management of security functions and parameters. Although this 
contradicts to decentralization requirement of P2PSIP, we believe it is necessary for 
security and privacy enhancement. We also combine these two solutions to achieve 
optimal security protection. 
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Thirdly, we illustrate shortcoming of current proposal of “client” protocol and study an 
alternative solution, which is based on Thin Client architecture. The proposed Thin 
Client P2PSIP Gateway (TC-PPSG) acts as a gateway for handling translation tasks 
between P2PSIP overlay and Internet.  
Finally, a possible inter-working system model is introduced to interconnect P2PSIP 
network and future All-IP based IMS network. The system architecture includes the 
inter-working solution, and use security mechanisms according to previous proposals..   
8.2. FUTURE WORKS 
The research of P2PSIP is still in the initial stage. There are still many critical issues to 
be addressed. Following areas are critical for future adoption of P2PSIP: 
Extended Usage Scenario 
The study of P2PSIP usage scenario is one of the important future works. Although a 
few use scenarios have been presented and implemented to validate proposed 
solutions, they are mostly focused on session initiation phase. This thesis work 
considers little about further services after initiation, such as session modification and 
negotiation tasks. Besides, some other advanced use scenarios, such as presence 
services, Voice over IP (VoIP), etc., need to be investigated. 
DHT overlay flexibility 
Another challenge is DHT overlay flexibility problem Currently, Chord algorithm is 
suggested as the only mandatory overlay technology for supporting P2PSIP 
communication. However, many overlay algorithms (e.g. Kademlia, CAN, etc) are 
supposed to be coexisting in near future. Therefore, one important issue is to 
investigate whether solutions proposed in the thesis suitable for other overlay 
environments based on different algorithms.  
Besides, DHT overlay should be capable to inter-work among different overlay 
technologies. In [74] authors propose that each overlay selects a “Super Node” to 
construct another DHT overlay and act as an relay peer. 
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Service Discovery 
Currently, the design of P2PSIP protocol does not pay much attention to service 
discovery mechanisms. For example, in peer bootstrap process, important elements, 
such as bootstrap peers, enrolment servers, STUN/TURN servers, etc., are assumed to 
be pre-configured. This might not be extendable especially because these elements 
might be not always reliable (for instance, some of them might become offline, or 
service unreachable temporally). Therefore, it is necessary to design common services 
discovery mechanisms suitable for P2PSIP overlay.  
 
Reliability   
The implementation and result in thesis work is given an assumption: overlay is stable 
without much churn (peer leave/join the overlay frequently). However, in reality 
portable P2PSIP peers (with limited CPU power, unstable wireless connection, and 
small cache) are possible to cause much churn and expose negative effect in overlay, 
according to research of [69, 72, 87]. Let us consider an even worse case (lowest layer 
in Figure 3-8), in which most of overlay peers are unreliable portable devices. This 
typical case is expected to be quite inefficient. Therefore, it is necessary to make a 
detailed analysis of such typical use scenario to develop novel approaches with 
improved performance.   
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APPENDIX A. SIP Methods 
RFC 3261 defines six basic SIP methods for session initiation: “INVITE”, “100 
Trying”, “180 Ringing”, “ACK”, “200 OK”, “BYE”. In this section, we show an 
example for each of SIP method. Corresponding interaction diagram is shown in 
Figure 2-7.    
INVITE 
INVITE sip:bob@biloxi.com SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bK776asdhds 
Max-Forwards: 70 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com> 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710@pc33.atlanta.com 
CSeq: 314159 INVITE 
Contact: <sip:alice@pc33.atlanta.com> 
Content-Type: application/sdp 
Content-Length: 142 
 
100 Trying 
SIP/2.0 100 Trying 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8;received=192.0.2.1 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com> 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 
CSeq: 314159 INVITE 
Content-Length: 0 
 
180 Ringing 
SIP/2.0 180 Ringing 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP server10.biloxi.com;branch=z9hG4bK4b43c2ff8.1;received=192.0.2.3 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDPbigbox3.site3.atlanta.com 
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    ;branch=z9hG4bK77ef4c2312983.1;received=192.0.2.2 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8;received=192.0.2.1 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com>;tag=a6c85cf 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 
Contact: <sip:bob@192.0.2.4> 
CSeq: 314159 INVITE 
Content-Length: 0 
 
ACK 
ACK sip:bob@192.0.2.4 SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds9 
Max-Forwards: 70 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com>;tag=a6c85cf 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>; tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 
CSeq: 314159 ACK 
Content-Length: 0 
 
200 OK 
SIP/2.0 200 OK 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP server10.biloxi.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8;received=192.0.2.3 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP bigbox3.site3.atlanta.com 
    ;branch=z9hG4bK77ef4c2312983.1;received=192.0.2.2 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bK776asdhds ;received=192.0.2.1 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com>;tag=a6c85cf 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710@pc33.atlanta.com 
CSeq: 314159 INVITE 
Contact: <sip:bob@192.0.2.4> 
Content-Type: application/sdp 
Content-Length: 131 
 
BYE 
BYE sip:alice@pc33.atlanta.com SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.4;branch=z9hG4bKnashds10 
Max-Forwards: 70 
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From: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com>;tag=a6c85cf 
To: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 
CSeq: 231 BYE 
Content-Length: 0 
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APPENDIX B. P2PSIP System Specification 
Each peer in P2PSIP system handles three functionalities: peer initiation function (for 
participating the overlay), request sending function (for initiating the request), and 
request handling function (for processing the received messages). The following is the 
detail algorithm specifications.  
Peer Initiation 
 
for each peer{ 
 
       //ask enrolment server for finger table 
       getFingerTable(my_id);  
         
          //create a embedded cache database 
           createDerbyServer(“peer ” + my_id);   
           createPeerCache(“peercache ”  + my_id);    
       
         //listening on a specific port, which is defined as 9000+ peer ID 
       openServerSocket(my_port);    
 
} 
 
Sending Request 
 
//when source peer wants to initiate a request  
private void jButtonActionPerformed(){ 
 
       //encapsulate a P2PSIP “INVITE” request 
       String invite = generateInvite(); 
 
       //may be destination peer profile is already in cache history 
       String dest_IP_port = getCacheRecord(dest_id); 
       if(dest_IP != null){ 
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             //destination peer is already in the cache, just send the request 
             sendRequestDatagram(dest_IP_port); 
        
       }else{ 
 
                  //find a downstream peer according to Chord algorithm  
                  String downstream_peer = lookupDownstreamPeer(); 
                  sendRequest(invite, downstream_peer);                     
 
               } 
 
   } 
         
Request Handling  
 
while receiving (message){ 
 
       //read the message, parse it 
       int source_id = getSourceID(message);  
       int dest_id = getSourceID(message);  
          
       if(message is “INVITE”) { 
 
              if(i am intermediate peer){ 
                  
                   //find a downstream peer according to Chord algorithm 
                   String downstream_peer_id = lookupDownstreamPeer(); 
                   forwardInvite(invite, downstream_peer_id);  
             
              } 
              if(i am destination peer){ 
                    
                    // generate “180 Ringing” response 
                    String resp_180Ringing = generate180Ring(); 
                    sendResponse(resp_180Ringing, source_id); 
            
              } 
 
      } 
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      else if (message is “180 Ringing”){ 
 
            //only source peer is able to receive “180 Ringing” 
            //do nothing currently  
 
      } 
} 
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APPENDIX C. Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) 
Specification 
One of the critical tasks of Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) is to receive and handle request 
messages from P2PSIP peer. According to the parameters in request messages, CSP 
chooses different handling mechanisms. The algorithm is described below. 
Handling Request 
 
while receiving (message){ 
 
       //read the message, parse it 
       int source_id = getSourceID(message);  
       int dest_id = getSourceID(message);  
       int call_id = getCallID(message); 
       if(message is “INVITE”) { 
                //temporally store message into cache 
                    insertDerbyRecord(message, call_id);     
 
               // generate “PingRequest” message.  
               //set source id to my_id. 
               String pingRequest = generatePingRequest(dest_id, my_id); 
                
               //calculate a few successors as downstream peers,  
               //according to Chord algorithm  
                int [] downstream_peers = calculate_downstream(); 
 
               //multicast pingRequest to a few successors 
               sendMulticast(pingRequest, source_id);            
 
        }else if (message is “200 OK”){ 
            //destination peer returns the response,  
            //should forwards original “INVITE” message 
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            sendRequest(message, dest_IP);  
             
            //delete the internal cache record 
             deleteDerbyRecord(call_ id); 
      }} 
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APPENDIX D. Secure Opinion Server (SOS) 
Specification 
Secure Opinion Server (SOS) is deployed as a HTTP application server. The main 
functionality component is a servlet “OpinionResponse”, which receives a list of route 
candidates, applies subjective logic based trust calculations, and selects the most 
trustful route option. Below is the SOS deployment description.   
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<web-app xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee" xmlns:web="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-
app_2_5.xsd" xsi:schemaLocation="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee 
http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-app_2_5.xsd" id="WebApp_ID" version="2.5"> 
  <display-name>secureopinionserver</display-name> 
  <welcome-file-list> 
    <welcome-file>index.html</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>index.htm</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>index.jsp</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.html</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.htm</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.jsp</welcome-file> 
  </welcome-file-list> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
    <display-name>OpinionResponse</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>OpinionResponse</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.opinionservlet.OpinionResponse</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>OpinionResponse</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/OpinionResponse</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
</web-app> 
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Three major functionality algorithms are described in the following: 
  Opinion Calculation 
 
while receiving (message){ 
 
       //get the destination peer profile (id, ip, port) 
       int destProfile = getDestProfile(message); 
        
       //read the xml message, get a list of route options 
       String [] route = getRouteOptions(message);  
       float [] trust = 0.0;        
       float [] distrust = 0.0; 
       float [] uncertainty = 0.0; 
       
       float[] summary = 0.0;      
   
       for each route[i] {       
              //get its trust, distrust, and uncertainty value from Opinion DB. 
              //should have the encourage rule for intermediate peers, introduced next 
              trust[i] = getTrust(i); 
              distrust[i] = getDistrust(i); 
              uncertainty[i] = Uncertainty(i); 
               
         //calculate a summary V value for each route.   
         summary[i] = calculate(trust[i], distrust[i], uncertainty[i]);   
  } 
 
  //choose a route that owns highest value of summary[j] 
     sendRoute(route[j], destProfile); 
 
} 
 
 
Opinion Encouragement Function 
 
For each intermediate peer { 
           
          //intermediate peers who have contributions to overlay should be encouraged.  
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          increaseTrust(); 
          decreaseDistrust(); 
          decreaseUncertainty(); 
 
} 
 
 
Opinion Punish function 
 
For each 10 minute{ 
 
        //Check each opinion DB record 
        if(updated){ 
             // do nothing 
        }else{ 
 
             //this peer is regarded have no contribution to overlay 
             // decrease trust value, increase distrust value, decrease uncertainty value 
             // according to the definition 
             decreaseTrust(); 
             increaseDistrust(); 
             increaseUncertainty(); 
 
       } 
  
} 
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APPENDIX E. P2PSIP IMS Gateway (PIGW) 
Specification 
P2PSIP IMS Gateway (PIGW) is deployed as an IMS Application server, as well as a 
normal P2PSIP peer. We achieve the functionality of PIGW through the revision of a 
P2PSIP node (with ID 260) in previous implementation. The following shows the 
deployment description.  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<web-app xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee" xmlns:web="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-
app_2_5.xsd" xsi:schemaLocation="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee 
http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-app_2_5.xsd" id="WebApp_ID" version="2.5"> 
  <display-name>peer260</display-name> 
  <welcome-file-list> 
    <welcome-file>index.html</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>index.htm</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>index.jsp</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.html</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.htm</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.jsp</welcome-file> 
  </welcome-file-list> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
    <display-name>Pigw260</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>Pigw260</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.Pigw260</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>Pigw260</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/Pigw260</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
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    <display-name>TestingServlet</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>TestingServlet</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.TestingServlet</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>TestingServlet</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/TestingServlet</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
</web-app> 
Besides, PIGW contains a SIP servlet, named “HanldingSipServlet”, for receiving SIP 
messages from IMS network, handling the translation task between IMS and P2PSIP. 
The servlet deployment description is:  
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE sip-app PUBLIC "-//Java Community Process//DTD SIP Application 1.0//EN" 
"http://www.jcp.org/dtd/sip-app_1_0.dtd"> 
 
<sip-app> 
<servlet> 
  <servlet-name>HandlingSipServlet</servlet-name> 
  <display-name>HandlingSipServlet</display-name> 
  <description></description> 
  <servlet-class> 
    no.uia.sipservlet.HandlingSipServlet 
  </servlet-class> 
</servlet> 
 
<servlet-mapping> 
<servlet-name>HandlingSipServlet</servlet-name> 
 
<pattern> 
  <or> 
  <equal> 
    <var>request.method</var> 
    <value>MESSAGE</value> 
  </equal> 
</or> 
</pattern> 
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</servlet-mapping> 
 
</sip-app> 
 
The major functionality of PIGW is to translate data signals between P2PSIP and IMS 
network. The detail is described in the following: 
 
Message Translation  
 
  while receiving (message){ 
 
       if(message is from peer){ 
                  
                 //ask enrollment server about mapping of peer ID to SIP URI   
                 String sourceSipUri = getMapping(source_id); 
                 String destSipUri = getMapping(dest_id); 
 
                 //replace peer ID to SIP URI, encapsulate a P2PSIP message 
                 String imsMessage = generateSIPMessage(); 
 
              //according to SIP URI, IMS core is able to locate destination UA 
              sendMessage(imsMessage); 
       } else if(message is from IMS network){ 
               
                //ask enrollment server about mapping of SIP URI to peer ID 
                int sourceID = getMapping(source_uri); 
                int destID = getMapping(dest_uri); 
 
                   //replace peer ID to SIP URI, encapsulate a P2PSIP message 
                String p2psipMessage = generateP2PSIPMessage(); 
                 
                //according to SIP URI, IMS core is able to locate destination UA 
                sendMessage(p2psipMessage); 
 
       } 
}       
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APPENDIX F. Thin Client P2PSIP Gateway (TC-
PPSG) Specification  
Thin Client P2PSIP Gateway (TC-PPSG) is deployed as an HTTP application server, 
as well as a normal P2PSIP Peer. We achieve the functionality of TC-PPSG through 
the revision of a P2PSIP node (with ID 260) in previous implementation. It contains 
several HTTP servlets for receiving HTTP request and generating corresponding 
response. Here is the deployment description file. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<web-app xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee" xmlns:web="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-
app_2_5.xsd" xsi:schemaLocation="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee 
http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/javaee/web-app_2_5.xsd" id="WebApp_ID" version="2.5"> 
  <display-name>peer260</display-name> 
  <welcome-file-list> 
    <welcome-file>index.html</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>index.htm</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>index.jsp</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.html</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.htm</welcome-file> 
    <welcome-file>default.jsp</welcome-file> 
  </welcome-file-list> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
    <display-name>Pigw260</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>Pigw260</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.Pigw260</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>Pigw260</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/Pigw260</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
  <servlet> 
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    <description></description> 
    <display-name>TestingServlet</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>TestingServlet</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.TestingServlet</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>TestingServlet</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/TestingServlet</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
    <display-name>ValidateServlet</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>ValidateServlet</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.ValidateServlet</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>ValidateServlet</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/ValidateServlet</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
    <display-name>RegisterServlet</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>RegisterServlet</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.RegisterServlet</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>RegisterServlet</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/RegisterServlet</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
  <servlet> 
    <description></description> 
    <display-name>InstantMsgHttpServlet</display-name> 
    <servlet-name>InstantMsgHttpServlet</servlet-name> 
    <servlet-class>no.uia.httpservlet.InstantMsgHttpServlet</servlet-class> 
  </servlet> 
  <servlet-mapping> 
    <servlet-name>InstantMsgHttpServlet</servlet-name> 
    <url-pattern>/InstantMsgHttpServlet</url-pattern> 
  </servlet-mapping> 
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</web-app> 
One major task of TC-PPSG is to translate data signals between P2PSIP and Internet, 
as described in the following:  
Message Translation 
 
when receiving (HTTP Post){ 
 
               int callID = getCallID(message);  
               String msg = getMessage(message); 
  
               //ask enrollment server about mapping of SIP URI to peer ID   
            int sourceID = getMapping(source_uri); 
            int destID = getMapping(dest_uri); 
               
               //encapsulate a P2PSIP message 
               String p2psipMessage = generateP2PSIPMessage(source ID, destID, callID, 
msg); 
             
            //find a corresponding CSP that is responsible for the destination peer 
            // and send p2psip message to the overlay 
            int csp = lookupCSP();         
            sendMessage(p2psipMessage, csp); 
 
       } 
}       
when receiving (p2psip message){ 
 
           //parse useful information 
               int callID = getCallID(message);  
               String msg = getMessage(message); 
 
               //ask enrollment server about mapping of SIP URI to peer ID   
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            int sourceUri = getMapping(source_id); 
            int destUri = getMapping(dest_id); 
                               
               //store into database 
               insertMsgRecord(“Instant message”, sourceUri, destUri, msg) ; 
            
       } 
}       
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